臺灣大學哲學系黃懿梅Huang, Yih-MeiYih-MeiHuang2006-12-192018-05-292006-12-192018-05-292004-10-16http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/2006121215550888在討論自由意志問題中，我們要問：為什麼我們應該關心自己是否有自由意志以及決定論是否是真的？我們之所以關心自己是否有自由意志是因為我們關心道德責任。一個行為者如果沒有自由意志，那麼就不能要求他負道德責任。這個原則就是其他選擇可能性原則”(the principle of alternative possibilities 簡稱PAP)。PAP 是這樣的：一個人為他所做的行為道德責任，那麼他能做其他不同的事。There is a important principle in the problem of free-will. This principle is called “the principle of alternate possibilities” ( hereinafter : PAP)which states that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. Harry G. Frankfurt has presented a series of putative counterexamples to PAP. (“Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” Journal of Philosophy 66,1969,pp.829-39) The “Frankfurt-style” examples have evoked considerable discussion. One general form of response to the examples is in the examples there are alternative possibilities. Our aim in this paper is to discuss that whether Frankfurt –style examples undermine PAP? (1) Are there alternative possibilities in Frankfurt–style examples? (2) Is an agent moral responsible for a decision although he could not have avoided making it? Or whether Fischer on alternative possibilities and responsibility is correct? (3) And we also discuss Van Inwagen’s three principles which is established the link between ability to do otherwise and responsibility.application/pdf735807 bytesapplication/pdfzh-TW自由意志其他選擇的可能性道德責任形上學決定論Moral responsibilityalternative possibilityfree willmetaphysicsdeterminismjournal articlehttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/2006121215550888/1/1160018374629633580208.pdfhttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/2006121215550888/-1/0028_200410_2.pdf