劉乃熒劉順仁2025-10-312025-10-312025-05https://doi.org/10.6675%2fJCA.202505_26(1).0002https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/733335This study uses data from a real estate company to investigate whether a pay-to-quit program can be a valid selection mechanism that encourages ill-fitting employees to voluntarily leave but retains better fitting employees. The empirical results indicate that probationary sales agents who stayed sold more and higher-valued houses than those who took the payment and left the company. To further explore whether the pay-to-quit program can improve the matching quality of hired probationary sales agents, we examine whether probationary sales agents who were selected through the traditional interview with a pay-to-quit program and stayed would show a higher level of matching quality in terms of duration and job performance than those who were only selected through the traditional interview. The results indicate that probationary sales agents who were selected through the traditional interview with a pay-to-quit program and stayed show a lower rate of departure and better job performance. The results provide evidence that a pay-to-quit program can serve as a useful selection mechanism.enpay-to-quit programemployee selectionself-selectionmatching qualityjournal article10.6675/JCA.202505_26(1).0002