中華技術學院財務?融系; 國立臺灣大學農業經濟學系Department of Finance, China Institute of Technology; Department of Agricultural Economics, National Taiwan University黃偉倫孫立群Huang, A.A.HuangSun, L.C.L.C.Sun2017-09-082018-06-292017-09-082018-06-292007-12http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/282164本文應用Laffont (1975)、Bordignon (1990)及Bilodeau and Gravel(2004)的康得原則於廠商負擔污染防治成本的賽局模型，進而分析自發性污染防治協議的道德限制對廠商??的影響。模型結果證明，自發性污染防治協議可使廠商間存在一個符合道德評價相同及?性的康得原則（道德限制），則各廠商會提供?德爾均衡?，且?柏?圖效?解。This paper use Kantian Maxim of Laffont (1975)、Bordignon (1990) and Bilodeau and Gravel (2004) on the game in which firms spontaneously prevent or control pollution was set to understand how the voluntary agreement influences the behaviors of firms. The results proved that voluntary agreement makes firms agree with the moral restraint of firm interaction, Kantian Maxim, which meets the same moral evaluation and ration assumption. In Kantian Maxim, all firms provide Lindahl equilibrium quantity and Pareto efficiency solution.18786710 bytesapplication/pdf康得原則污染防治自發性協議Kantian MaximPollution preventionVoluntary agreementjournal articlehttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/282164/1/0039_200712_4.pdf