陳業寧臺灣大學：財務金融學研究所林佳佑Lin, Chia-YuChia-YuLin2007-11-282018-07-092007-11-282018-07-092007http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/60906　　美國國會於2002年7月通過的沙賓法案（Sarbanes-Oxley Act）禁止了公開發行公司提供公司主管和董事貸款，使得公司不再能夠給經理人購股貸款，幫助經理人增加對公司的持股以減少股東與經理人間的代理問題。該法案無疑地減少了股東可利用來降低與經理人間代理問題的一個手段，而本文也提出禁止公司給予經理人購股貸款的結果可能反而對股東造成傷害，違反了該法案保護投資人的本意。 　　本文建構一理論模型探討當股東和經理人間存在代理問題，股東需要給予經理人限制性股票、購股貸款或選擇權做為誘因才能使經理人付出努力進行投資計畫時，這三種不同方法下股東所面臨的成本為何，並決定哪些情況下股東採用哪一種方法最為有利。本文提出：由於三種方法的成本大小會隨公司所處情境不同而改變，因此這三種誘因工具在不同情境下都有可能是對股東最有利的方式，貿然禁止其中任何一種都可能使股東利益受到傷害。另外，豁免經理人債務的機率所代表的其實是幾種成本間的抵換關係，豁免機率愈高有時對股東反而愈有利。若直接將公司豁免經理人貸款的作法視為圖利經理人的證據恐怕太過武斷。最後我們提出當經理人進行計畫的努力成本與投資計畫的規模大小無關，或是經理人的努力成本具有規模效益時，規模愈大的公司愈適合以限制性股票作為激勵經理人努力的誘因工具。Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which was passed in July 2002, has made it unlawful for any public company to provide loans to its executive officers and directors. Thus companies can no longer grant their managers stock purchase loan to help them increase ownership in company and reduce the agency problem between shareholders and managers. This article suggests that the ban of stock purchase loan to managers might harm shareholders instead of protecting them. This article utilizes a model to analyze a situation, where agency problems exist and shareholders can only use restricted stock, stock purchase loan or stock option as incentives to induce managers devoting their effort in some investment plan. It explores the cost under each of these three incentive tools and determines which one is most beneficial for shareholders. The article concludes: the cost under each of these three incentive tools changes as the company’s situation changes, and each tool can be the most beneficial one for shareholders. Banning any one of these tools can, therefore, harm shareholders since they can no longer arbitrarily adopt a tool that benefits them most. It also suggests that forgiving loans to managers should not be thought as a direct proof of bad company governance. In fact, a positive forgiving rate of executive loan can benefit shareholders more than completely no forgiveness. At last, this article suggests that if managers’ effort is independent of or economical in the scale of investment plan, then the lager the company size is, the more suitable it is for the company to adopt restricted stock as its incentive tool.壹、前言………………………………………………………………1 貳、基本模型…………………………………………………………5 參、模型分析…………………………………………………………11 3-1當股東提出的是第一種誘因契約（給經理人股票）…………11 3-2當股東提出的是第二種誘因契約（給經理人貸款）…………14 3-3當股東提出的是第三種誘因契約（給經理人選擇權）………17 肆、比較與討論………………………………………………………21 4-1最有利之誘因契約………………………………………………21 4-2豁免債務的機率變動對股東和經理人決策及報酬之影響…29 4-3變動部分假設對結果的影響……………………………………37 4-4公司規模大小與誘因契約的選擇……………………………44 伍、結論………………………………………………………………46 參考文獻……………………………………………………………48 附錄……………………………………………………………………49en-US限制性股票購股貸款選擇權誘因契約incentiverestricted stockstock purchase loanoptionthesis