CHEN-NAN LIAOChen Y.-JTang C.S.2022-04-262022-04-26202223656395https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85121348319&doi=10.1007%2f978-3-030-81423-6_10&partnerID=40&md5=4639c2e9c9db6d5d61adb2173732e5fehttps://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/607931We examine the impact of information provision policies on farmer welfare in developing countries where farmers lack relevant and timely information for making informed decisions regarding which crop to grow and which market to sell in. Based on our equilibrium analysis, we find the following results. When market information is offered free of charge, we show that (a) providing information is always beneficial to farmers at the individual level and (b) providing information to all farmers may not be welfare maximizing at the aggregate level. To maximize farmer welfare, it is optimal to provide information to a targeted group of farmers who are located far away from either markets. However, to overcome perceived unfairness among farmers, we show that the government should provide information to all farmers at a nominal fee so that the farmers will adopt the intended optimal provision policy willingly. ? 2022, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.Emerging marketsInformation managementSocially responsible operationsbook part10.1007/978-3-030-81423-6_102-s2.0-85121348319