王泰昌臺灣大學：會計學研究所劉志諒Liu, Chih-LiangChih-LiangLiu2007-11-282018-06-292007-11-282018-06-292007http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/61644Montgomery　(1994) 研究報導中指出美國前五百大公開上市公司中有三分之二的企業從事異業多角化經營，這些公司的資產總額佔所有上市公司總資產的三分之二且提供二分之一的美國就業市場。此外，美國財務會計準則委員會於1997年發佈財務會計準則131號公報，此公報主要目的為增進多部門公司資訊的揭露程度。因此，多角化公司不僅在美國經濟上扮演著舉足輕重的角色，而且在會計上亦是受重視的課題。 本研究首先探討審計品質(會計師事務所的規模與會計師產業專家)與多角化之超額價值間的關連性。研究結果發現多角化公司更可能僱用規模大的會計師事務所或在產業上專精的會計師事務所來證實其財務報導及資訊揭露的可靠性，此關係在統計檢定上是非常顯著，更能呼應審計在資本市場上所扮演的監督與治理角色。整體而言，審計品質對資本市場是非常重要，尤其其所提供有價值資訊給投資者。 此外，此篇研究也從代理理論的觀點來探究是否審計品質能提升多角化公司的投資有效性問題。假如審計品質能透過降低以下兩種代理問題，將能促使多角化公司從事更有效率之投資。一、若會計師能提供更可靠的資訊來幫助外部投資者監督經理人的投資行為，將能約束經理人從事更有效率的投資。二、若會計師能提供有關部門間資本移轉資訊給經理人資金分配決策參考，將能促使其從事更有效率的部門投資。研究結果發現審計品質能提供多角化公司部門之投資有效性及更有效率之部門間資金分配，此結果不受會計師選擇的內生性、不同的審計品質變數衡量、投資變數衡量與不同的控制變數所影響。Montgomery (1994) reports that two-thirds of the Fortune 500 U.S. public companies were remarkably diversified and involved in more than one industry. These firms accounted for nearly 50% of U.S. employment and owned about 60% of the total assets of publicly traded firms (Martin and Sayrak, 2003). Also, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in June 1997 issued SFAS No. 131, which was enacted to improve information disclosure about the diversity of a diversified firm’s operations. Thus, diversified firms constitute a significant portion of the U.S. economy and important sector for accountants. First, this study examines the relation between the auditor quality (auditor size and auditor industry specialization) and the excess value attributed to diversification. Consistent with the hypothesis that monitoring and governance of audit are important to the capital markets, we find that (1) diversified firms are more likely to employ a Big N auditor or an industry-specialist auditor to signal the credibility of financial statement information for enhanced disclosures, (2) the relation between auditor quality and the excess value is most pronounced in diversified firms, and (3) the information role of audits is statistically significant to the stock market. Overall, our results suggest that, through their roles of producing valuable information to the investors, auditor quality matter to capital market participants. Second, we investigate how auditor quality relates to the investment efficiency in the diversified firms suffering from sever agency problems. We hypothesize that auditor quality can enhance investment efficiency in the diversification by reducing information asymmetry in two ways: First, an auditor can provide greater credibility information to shareholders, thereby helping them monitor managers’ actions, improving investment efficiencies. Second, auditors can improve the efficient allocation of capital across business segment, thereby removing information asymmetries between division managers and headquarters in internal capital markets. Our results are consistent with these hypotheses, suggesting that auditor quality can provide a monitoring mechanism on enhancing investment efficiency across segment and efficient allocation in internal capital. They are robust to correct for self-selection of auditor choice, different measures of auditor quality, alternative investment measures, and numerous control variables.Contents 誌謝 i 中文摘要 ii 英文摘要 iv Auditor Quality and Excess Value of Diversification 　 1 1. Introduction 1 2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 5 2.1 Agency cost and diversification 5 2.2 Auditor choice and diversification 6 2.3 Auditor industry specialization and diversification 8 2.4 Audit quality and excess-value of diversification 12 3. Sample selection and data 14 4. Research Design 16 4.1 Measuring audit quality 16 4.1.1 Auditor brand name 16 4.1.2 Auditor industry specialization 17 4.2 Measuring diversification 20 4.3 Measuring excess value of diversification 21 4.4 Empirical models 22 4.4.1 Auditor choice model 22 4.4.2 Auditor industry specialization choice model 24 4.4.3 Association between audit quality and excess value of diversification 25 4.5 Self-selection test for excess value and auditor choice 27 5. Empirical Results 28 5.1 Univariate results 28 5.2 Logit regression analysis for auditor choice 29 5.3 Logit and OLS regression analysis for Big N industry specialist choice 30 5.4 Multivariate analyses of excess value and Big N auditor 31 5.5 Multivariate analyses of excess value and Big N industry specialist auditor 32 5.6 The effect of SFAS 131 on the relation between excess value and auditor quality 34 5.7 Self-selection 34 5.8 Control for potential monitoring and corporate governance substitutes 35 5.9 Other robustness tests 36 6. Conclusions 37 References 39 Auditor Quality and Investment Efficiency of Diversified Firms 93 1. Introduction 93 2: Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 97 2.1 Literature Review 97 2.1.1 Research on Investment Policy in Diversification 97 2.1.2 The Role of Auditors 99 2.2 Hypothesis 101 3. Sample selection and data 102 4. Research Design 103 4.1 Measuring audit quality 103 4.1.1 Auditor brand name 103 4.1.2 Auditor industry specialization 104 4.2 Measuring cash flow sensitivity of investment 107 4.3 Measuring -investment efficiency 108 4.4 Measuring internal capital transfers 109 4.5 Empirical analyses 110 4.5.1 Association between auditor quality and cash flow sensitivity of investment 110 4.5.2 Association between auditor quality and firm- level investment efficiency 112 4.5.3 Association between auditor quality and internal capital transfers 113 4.6 Self-selection test for investment efficiency and auditor choice 113 5. Empirical Results 115 5.1 Univariate results 115 5.2 Investment cash-flow sensitivity and auditor quality 116 5.3 Firm-level Investment and auditor quality 117 5.4 Firm-level efficient internal capital transfers and auditor quality 118 5.5 The effect of SFAS 131 on the relation between excess value and auditor quality 119 5.6 Self-Selection 119 5.7 Control for Potential Monitoring and Corporate Governance Substitutes 120 5.8 Other robustness tests 122 6. Conclusions 123 References 125en-US多角化多角化折扣審計品質投資效率性代理問題DiversificationDiversification discountAudit qualityInvestment efficiencyAgency problemother