2011-08-012024-05-17https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/692924摘要：「道德危險」無疑是契約理論中最重要的議題之一，其意指雇主(principal)無法觀察到員工(agent)的某種作為。在這一個兩年期的計畫中，我們在道德危險之外，再考慮某些參賽者(players)另外擁有一些私有訊息(private information)。這個私有訊息是雇主，或是在主雇關係之外的第三者所觀察不到的。特別是我們考慮參賽者有機會將他的訊息傳遞給別人。我們想要討論在不同的組織或制度之下，訊息傳遞的情況。更重要的是，我們想要討論「最適組織」的問題。在每一年的計畫中，我們利用不同的模型，考慮不同的訊息結構，來討論不同的經濟議題。 本計畫第一年要考慮的是有「逃稅」情況時的道德危險問題。與一般道德危險模型不同的是，雇主除了設計工資結構使員工能夠努力工作之外，他還必須要考慮員工會面臨政府的課稅。然而，主雇之間的契約常常是政府無法觀察到的，也就是說，政府無法觀察到員工真正的工資。因此政府必須依賴雇主或員工的申報，而根據其申報的所得予以課稅，必要時再加以稽查。我們考慮兩種不同的申報制度：「雇主申報制」及「員工申報制」。此模型的特色是，在雇主申報制之下，如何幫助員工報稅會變成契約的一部份，也可以直接做為控制員工努力的機制之一。我們想要從雇者利潤，員工效用，與政府稅收等各方面討論何者是「最適申報制度」。 本計畫第二年要考慮的是在「延續性投資」之下「知識傳遞」的問題。我們考慮一個兩階段投資模型。每一期有一個員工負責投資或投入努力，但其投資多寡或努力程度無法被雇主觀察到。每一期的成果皆有成功或失敗的可能，但雇主只在意最後的成果。第一期的結果將會影響計畫最後的成敗；而如果第一期的結果是失敗，雇主的最適決策是停止該計畫。但雇主卻不能觀察到第一期的結果，只有第一期員工可以觀察得到。因此為了讓員工提供正確訊息，以提前終止不良的計畫，雇主必須付給員工一個訊息租。我們同時也考慮第一期的員工可以將其在得到的知識或經驗傳遞給第二期的員工，使其成本降低。但知識傳遞是有成本的。在這個架構下，我們想要討論對雇主而言，兩期都雇用同一個員工(合併組織)，或是兩期都雇用不同員工(分離組織)，哪一種組織較好？<br> Abstract: Moral hazard problem is one of the most important issues in contract theory. It means that the principal cannot observe some action made by the agent. In this two-year project, we consider there is another information asymmetry in addition to the moral hazard problem within the principal-agent relationship. Some players have a piece of private information that is unobservable by either the principal or an outsider. We want to discuss the information transmission between the principal and the agent, or between the insider and the outsider. In particular, we want to analyze the optimal organizational form. The first-year project considers a tax evasion problem. There is a moral hazard problem between the principal and the agent, and the principal offers a wage scheme to control the agent’s incentive to work. The contract however cannot be observable by an outsider, the government, who collects tax from the worker. The principal or the agent can submit a message regarding the worker’s income to the government, who can decide an audit policy based on the report. Players then have incentives to misreport the information and evade the tax. We want to study the optimal contract under two reporting systems: employer’s reporting and self reporting, and discuss the optimal reporting system. The second-year project considers a sequential investment problem with two stages. The principal can contract with either one or two agents. Each agent is responsible for a task in each stage. Besides the moral hazard problem, the first-stage agent can observe the outcome in the first stage, which is private information to him. Moreover, the knowledge acquired in the first stage can reduce the effort cost in the second stage if the knowledge is passed on. Therefore, the first-stage agent has two pieces of information that can be transmitted to different players. We want to discuss whether or not the separated agency (in the case where two different agents are hired) is better than the integrated agency (in the case where the same agent is hired).主從關係訊息傳遞道德危險最適組織Principal-agent relationshipinformation transmissionmoral hazardoptimal organization