陳聖賢臺灣大學:財務金融學研究所陳彥行2010-05-112018-07-092010-05-112018-07-092009U0001-1205200914010200http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/182783本文利用美國1982至2006年間所發生的235個罷工事件探討公司策略對於罷工時勞資間的談判力及罷工後營運績效的影響。實證結果顯示平均而言樣本公司在罷工當季營運績效顯著下降，但是在罷工後第一季便回到正常水準。有趣的是，樣本公司在罷工後第二季開始直到第七季營運績效反而領先同業，這種現象在規模較大，時間較長的罷工樣本中更為明顯。進一步分析顯示罷工後營運績效的提升可能來自於罷工結束時資方取得勞動成本較低的新契約。此外，罷工前後營運績效的改變與公司的策略有關。在罷工前降低現金比率及負債比率或囤積存貨的公司及非相關多角化的公司相對於勞方擁有較強的談判力，因此較有可能得到工會在薪資及福利上的讓步，從而在罷工後有較佳的營運績效。I study how corporate policies will affect firm’s bargaining power against union during strike by examining the post-strike operating performance. The sample consists of 235 struck firms in the United State from 1982 to 2006. Notwithstanding a substantial drop in ROA is found in the strike quarter, struck firms on average exhibit superior performance starting from the second post strike quarter. As a result, there are no significant performance changes from pre-strike year to strike year, suggesting that in a substantial portion of struck firms, the strike cost is mostly offset or dominated by the gain form union wage concession at the settlement. This result holds for strikes coming in large scale and long durations. Regression analysis reveals that, firms decreasing their debt ratio and cash ratio or increasing their inventory in terms of finished goods prior to strike and firms engaging in unrelated diversifications tend to have better bargaining power during strike and therefore are more likely to perform better after settlement. I also show that some institutional and industrial factors related to the bargaining power between union and struck firms can also have impact on the post-strike operating performance. These impacts are economically significant as well.口試委員會審定書 i辭 ii文摘要 iii文摘要 iv. Introduction 1. Data Description 5. How do strikes affect operating performance? 8.1 Theory and methodology 8.2 Whole sample analysis 10.3 Subsample analysis 12. How do corporate strategies affect the post strike operating performance? 13.1 Corporate strategies 14.2 Other institutional and industrial factors 17.3 Model specification 19.4 Empirical results 20.5 Causality concern 24.6 Economic significance 25. Conclusion 26ppendix 27application/pdf463655 bytesapplication/pdfen-US工會罷工談判力公司策略營運績效UnionLabor StrikeBargaining PowerCorporate StrategyOperating Performancethesishttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/182783/1/ntu-98-D93723001-1.pdf