YAO-MIN CHIANGChang P.-R.2022-04-262022-04-26202210590560https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85119402460&doi=10.1016%2fj.iref.2021.11.002&partnerID=40&md5=2ca8656a0931bfeaddaf1445ae4755bdhttps://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/608010This study examines the moderator effect of directors' and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance) on the relationship between ownership structure and overinvestment. We find that firms with D&O insurance and higher insurance coverage have a higher probability of overinvestment. These results show the D&O insurance is like a moral hazard effect. We also find evidence that the relationship between ownership structure and overinvestment is affected by D&O insurance. As well as the results support that the firms purchasing D&O insurance is moderator effect on ownership structure and overinvestment. ? 2021Directors's and officers' liability insuranceOverinvestmentOwnership structurejournal article10.1016/j.iref.2021.11.0022-s2.0-85119402460