管理學院: 商學研究所指導教授: 許鉅秉蔡佩君Tsai, Pei-ChunPei-ChunTsai2017-03-032018-06-292017-03-032018-06-292015http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/274497近年來，企業間不再只是單純的競爭或合作，尤其在高科技產業，愈來愈多企業處於既競爭又合作的關係，也就是所謂的「競合」（Coopetition），而在如此複雜的關係下，彼此的決策行為將互相牽連影響，形成一種供應鏈賽局。雖然在供應鏈領域中已有許多學者運用賽局針對不同議題進行分析與討論，例如：存貨、生產與訂價、合作廣告等，但特別探討高科技產業的競合，且將高科技產業中常見的侵權事件納入考量之相關文獻並不多，因此成為本研究的動機之一。 本論文以科技業的兩大領導廠商A公司與S公司作為研究案例，兩者在智慧型手機市場激烈競爭，同時S公司又是A公司重要的零組件供應商，導致A公司面臨S公司的專利侵權和在終端產品市場的威脅時，其實陷入決策的兩難。因此本研究將A公司可能的回應手段分成四個策略組合，運用斯塔克爾伯格模型和納許談判賽局概念，為各策略組合建構一個二階賽局模型，先於第一階段決定出使雙方效用函數最大化的零組件協商價格，第二階段則是決定A公司的最適產品產量，最終探討A公司應選擇何種策略組合才能獲得最大利潤。 藉由數值模擬、重要參數的敏感性分析結果，本研究得以對各個策略組合做更深入的比較與分析，同時結果顯示本模型應能有效提供A公司於決策時的理論與數據支持，而本研究也提出了具實務與管理意涵的建議，希望協助其他科技業成員在面臨相同情況時，可以採取較好的決策，為競合供應鏈管理這個領域做出些許貢獻。Existing researches on relationships between firms focus either on competitive or on cooperative relationships. However, in recent years, especially in high-tech industry, many firms cooperate and compete simultaneously, that is so-called “Coopetition”. In coopetitive relationship, any member’s action or decision will have impact on others, which forms a “game” in the supply chain. Although many scholars have already used game theory to discuss different topics in supply chain, such as inventory, production and pricing, few researches investigate coopetition and common patent infringement in high-tech industry. All of these motivated me to do this study. This paper uses two leading high-tech firms Company A and Company S as study case. Both compete vigorously in smart phone market, but Company S is one of major component suppliers for Company A. That’s why Company A falls in a dilemma when faces with patent infringement from Company S. This work tries to construct a two-stage game-based model for each possible strategic portfolio of Company A by utilizing the Stackelberg model and Nash bargaining game. In Stage1, we seek the negotiation solution (i.e.,W1 ) for cooperative agreements between them. Based on the output of cooperative agreements, Company A production quantities are determined in Stage2. Finally, we discuss which strategic portfolio will maximize Company A’s profit. We do in-depth discussions and comparisons using the results of numerical illustration and sensitivity analysis. The results also indicate that this proposed model can effectively support Company A’s decisions. This work tries to give some practical and managerial suggestions, which might help other high-tech firms make better decisions when they face with similar conditions.1856737 bytesapplication/pdf論文公開時間: 2016/7/31論文使用權限: 同意無償授權供應鏈管理競合關係專利侵權斯塔克爾伯格模型納許談判賽局Supply chain managementCoopetitionPatent infringementStackelberg modelNash bargaining gamethesishttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/274497/1/ntu-104-R02741004-1.pdf