2014-07-162024-05-18https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/698957摘要：本研究的目地為探討Clawback provisions 對盈餘管理的影響。不同於過去的文獻，本研究專注於公司採用Clawbacks的動機。有些公司可能為提高公司治理且提升財報品質而採用Clawbacks，而其他公司則名義上採用Clawbacks但未對公司財報進行改變。為了驗證此假設，我先以公司採用Clawback的時間、公司財報的動機在採用Clawback期間的改變、及公司環境的變化將採公司分為認真的採用者及自我標榜的採用者。之後並檢驗Clawback provisions是否對此兩種的採用者在盈餘管理上有不同的影響。<br> Abstract: The study examines earnings management around voluntary clawback adoptions. In contrast to previous studies, I focus on the firm-level heterogeneity in the motives of clawback adoption. Some firms may adopt clawback provisions as their broad strategy to improve corporate governance and enhance reporting quality, while others may adopt clawbacks more in name, and thus do not make material changes in reporting behavior. To test the predictions, I classify firms as serious and label adopters using the year that firms adopt clawbacks as relative to other peer adopters , firm-level changes in reporting incentives, and firm-level changes in reporting environment around clawback adoptions. I further analyze whether the changes in earnings management are different between serious and label adopters, and whether different partitions of serious and label adopters are associated with the observed changes in earnings management.薪酬追回制度盈餘管理Clawback ProvisionsEarnings Management