Department of Economics, National Taiwan University; Humanities and Social Sciences, and Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica國立臺灣大學經濟系; 中央研究院人文社會科學研究中心與經濟所（Humanities and Social Sciences, and Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica）Koo, Hui-wenHui-wenKooChen, Kong-pinKong-pinChen古慧雯陳恭平2017-09-082018-06-282017-09-082018-06-281998http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/282205http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/282205/1/index.htmlThis paper considers the effect on competitive bidding when an auction is localized. Two kinds of auctions are considered: the first-price and the all- pay auctions. To some extent, the bidders exhibit opposite behavior depending on which auction is used. The Central Limit Theorem of Mosteller(1946) is used to explain the difference. Our analysis can be applied to various settings including school entrance, election zoning, and promotion.本文比較集中式拍賣與分散式拍賣兩種制度下買者的競價行為。我們分別就「贏者付價」與「全體付價」兩種習見的拍賣進行探討。本文的分析顯示，將商品分散四處拍賣的效果將因「贏者付價」或「全體付價」的要求而有所不同。我們藉用Mosteller(1946)之中央極限定理來解釋其間的差異。本文之分析可應用於「自願升學方案」、競選、人事升遷等制度設計的問題上。159 bytestext/html拍賣競標AuctionsBiddingjournal articlehttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/282205/1/index.html