2004-08-012024-05-17https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/670343摘要：本計畫將研究心靈哲學的一個重要論爭：知覺經驗的內涵（content）是概念性的還是非概念性的？根據概念論（conceptualism），我們之所以能說經驗是關於外在世界，以及經驗能提供理由來支持信念，乃是由於經驗內涵是概念性的。根據非概念論（nonconceptualism），雖然對經驗進行描述需要運用概念能力（conceptual capacities），但若因此認為概念是經驗的構成成分，則是一項嚴重錯誤。在本計劃裏，我將處理關於此論爭的三個重要議題。第一，探討現象意識（phenomenal consciousness）與知覺意向性（perceptual intentionality）之間的關係。我準備攻詰分離論（separatism）以及Dreske與Tye的表徵論（representationalism），並為構成論（constitutivism）辯護。第二，檢驗非概念論的一個重要論證；根據此論證，要擁有感覺經驗並不需要具備相關的概念。我打算指出，對於此論證是否成功，概念論與非概念論現有的主張和理由均不能令人滿意。我會對此議題提出自己的立場。第三，檢驗非概念論的另一個重要論證：t<br> Abstract: This project investigates an important debate in the philosophy of mind: whether the content of perceptual experience is conceptual or nonconceptual? According to conceptualism, it is because the content of experience is conceptual that we are entitled to say that our experience is about the external world and that experience can justify empirical beliefs. According to nonconceptualism, although we need to exercise conceptual capacities to describe experience, it is very wrong to think that experience is thereby constituted by concepts. In this project, I plan to tackle three related issues on this debate. First, I want to investigate the relation between phenomenal consciousness and perceptual intentionality. I intend to argue for constitutivism against Dretske’s and Tye’s representationalism and against the so-called separativism. Second, I will examine an important argument for nonconceptualism, according to which one can have perceptual experience without having relevant concepts. I intend to show that the current arguments offered by both conceptualists and nonconceptualists are wanting, and then propose my own view on this issue. Third, I will examine another important argument for nonconceptualism&#8213;the Fineness of Grain Argument. I intend to show that this argument is not able to refute conceptualism. Finally, I will propose my overall position on the conceptualism-nonconceptualism debate regarding the content of experience.意識意向性經驗非概念性內涵ConsciousnessIntentionalityExperienceNonconceptual Content