陳郁蕙臺灣大學：農業經濟學研究所林晉民Lin, Chin-MinChin-MinLin2007-11-282018-06-292007-11-282018-06-292004http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/59071海上箱網養殖為近年來政府積極推廣、發展的養殖漁業，然其以海為田的養殖方式深受天然災害及環境變化之影響。台灣冬季有東北季風吹襲，夏季則有颱風侵襲，海上箱網養殖經營風險高，為使我國海上箱網養殖能與其他國外先進箱網養殖國家競爭，除應持續加強生產技術與設備之研發，降低生產成本外，宜建立一套適合產業之保險制度，降低經營風險，使養殖業者安心從事生產，擴大經營規模提昇產量。 國內諸多文獻皆認為保險制度可降低箱網養殖業者所面臨之風險，國外文獻亦指出保險制度會影響農民之生產決策，且依農民風險態度之不同，影響程度亦不同。但國內分析箱網養殖業者之風險態度，並進而分析建立保險制度對箱網養殖業者生產決策造成之影響等相關研究卻付之闕如。目前海上箱網養殖又以海鱺為主要養殖魚種。因此，本研究先分析海鱺箱網養殖業者之風險態度，並依此風險態度來分析實施保險制度對海鱺箱網養殖業者生產決策之影響，提供政府制訂海上箱網養殖保險制度之參考。 實證上，本研究利用Pope, Chavas and Just(1983)與Pope(1988)所提出之參數檢定法來檢定海上箱網養殖業者之風險態度，進而在生產者追求預期效用極大之假設下，透過蒙地卡羅積分法(Monte Carlo Integration)來探討保險制度對海鱺箱網養殖業者生產決策之影響。茲將本文研究結果整理如下： 一、在10%的顯著水準下仍無法拒絕海上箱網養殖業者之風險態度屬於固定絕對風險趨避，故假設海上海鱺箱網養殖業者之風險態度屬於固定絕對風險趨避。 二、未實施保險制度前，風險趨避程度越高之海鱺箱網養殖業者，其最適飼料投入量越低。實施保險制度後，不論養殖業者之風險趨避程度高低，其最適飼料投入量皆呈現上升的情形。 三、當保險水準高於70%時，海鱺箱網養殖業者之最適飼料投入量呈現下降情形，且最適飼料投入量下降幅度隨保險水準增加而增加。 四、在同樣的保險水準下，風險趨避程度越高之養殖業者，其生產決策所受之影響越大。 五、若箱網養殖保險制度之承保機構為政府時，在考量政府財政以及所得公平分配之情形下，宜採用收益保險制度，且保險水準不宜定得太高，保險水準在70%以下為宜。The offshore cage aquaculture is the fishery which the government popularized and developed actively in recent years. However, the manner of cultivation it utilize the sea as field is deeply influenced by natural calamity and environmental changes. In Taiwan, due to northeastern monsoon in winter and typhoon in summer, the offshore cage aquaculture is operated at a high risk. In order to increase the competitiveness of offshore cage aquaculture of our country to compete with foreign countries with advanced cage aquaculture, we should not only continuously strengthen the research development of production technology and equipment, but reduce the production cost, as well as setting up an insurance, which is suitable for the industry to reduce risk, so as to make producers relieved in producing, expand cultivated scale and increase the outputs. It is indicated in many literatures that insurance could lower the risk which producers may face in Taiwan. Some foreign literatures also point out that insurance will influence farmer’s production decisions, and the degree of impacts depends on the risk attitudes that the farmers hold. We find that there is no literature trying to analyze the risk attitude of cobia cage aquaculture producers. Furthermore, there is no literature trying to analyze the impacts of implementing insurance on the producers’ production decisions in the situation that the risk attitude of cobia cage aquaculture producers are known. Nowadays, the cobia is the main type of fish in offshore cage aquaculture in Taiwan. As a result, this research is trying to analyze the risk attitudes of the cobia cage aquaculture producers, and analyze the impacts of implementing insurance on cobia cage aquaculture producers’ production decisions. We hope that the result of this research can provide the government for reference of making policies on offshore cage aquaculture insurance. In empirical analyses, this research uses the approach which Pope, Chavas and Just published in 1983 to analyze the risk attitudes of the offshore cage aquaculture producers, under the assumptions of maximizing producers’ utility, what’s more, we try to discuss the impacts of implementing insurance on the cobia cage aquaculture producers’ production decisions by Monte Carlo Integration approach. The conclusions of this research are sorted as follows: 1. Under 10% significance level, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the risk attitudes of offshore cage aquaculture producers are constant absolute risk aversion producer. Therefore, we assumed that the risk attitudes of the offshore cobia cage aquaculture producers are constant absolute risk aversion producers. 2. Prior to bringing insurance into practice, the higher the degree of risk aversion of the cobia cage aquaculture producer is, the lower the optimal feed input used. With insurance, all cobia cage aquaculture producers will increase the feed input. 3. When the insurance level is higher than 70%, the optimal feed input used will decrease gradually, and the level of decrease increases as the insurance level rise. 4. Under the same insurance level, the higher the degree of the risk aversion of the producer is, the more impact the producer face. 5. If the cage aquaculture insurance is implemented by the government, on consideration of the government’s financial status and social income distribution, the revenue insurance should be adopted, and the insurance level can’t be set too high, insurance level should be under 70%.第一章 緒論.............................................1 第一節 研究動機與研究目的.............................1 第二節 研究步驟.......................................4 第三節 論文架構.......................................6 第二章 台灣箱網養殖產業概況.............................7 第一節 台灣箱網養殖發展沿革...........................7 第二節 台灣箱網養殖生產概況..........................12 第三節 海鱺之特徵、習性與營養成分......................24 第四節 台灣箱網養殖海鱺產銷概況........................28 第五節 現階段台灣箱網養殖面臨之問題..................35 第三章 文獻回顧........................................42 第一節 箱網養殖相關文獻..............................42 第二節 生產者風險態度之相關文獻........................49 第三節 農業保險相關文獻..............................53 第四章 理論模型........................................62 第一節 預期效用理論..................................62 第二節 風險態度檢定....................................66 第三節 保險制度對生產者決策之影響....................70 第五章 實證模型及估計..................................80 第一節 養殖業者之風險態度檢定........................80 第二節 箱網養殖生產決策之實證模型設定................97 第三節 箱網養殖生產決策之估計.......................103 第四節 產出保險制度下之政策模擬.....................114 第五節 收益保險制度下之政策模擬.....................119 第六節 政策涵義.....................................123 第六章 結論與建議.....................................125 第一節 結論.........................................125 第二節 建議.........................................127 第三節 研究限制及未來研究方向.......................129 參考文獻...............................................131815987 bytesapplication/pdfen-US生產決策風險態度箱網養殖保險制度海鱺Risk AttitudeCobiaProduction DecisionInsuranceCage Aquaculture[SDGs]SDG14thesishttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/59071/1/ntu-93-R91627003-1.pdf