Hu S.Ma Z.-J.JIUH-BIING SHEU2020-03-062020-03-062019https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/472090Firms usually offer trade-in programs to entice consumers to purchase next generation products. By considering the purchase behavior of both myopic consumers and strategic consumers, we propose a game-theoretic analytical model to determine the optimal price of the next generation products and the optimal trade-in rebate. We find that firm's optimal price of the next generation products increases with the incremental value. The optimal trade-in rebate decreases with the trade-in duration. The firm's optimal profit increases with the trade-in duration, but decreases with the incremental value. © 2019 Elsevier LtdConsumer behavior; Pricing; Products upgrade; Trade-in duration; Trade-in rebate[SDGs]SDG12analytical method; consumption behavior; game theory; price dynamics; profitability; trade flowOptimal prices and trade-in rebates for successive-generation products with strategic consumers and limited trade-in durationjournal article10.1016/j.tre.2019.02.004https://www2.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85062000430&doi=10.1016%2fj.tre.2019.02.004&partnerID=40&md5=3eac3dc20c45a90860651229c8ef4f3d