Taleizadeh A.A.Sane-Zerang E.TSAN MING CHOI2022-05-302022-05-302018https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85040739627&doi=10.1109%2fTSMC.2016.2594808&partnerID=40&md5=ba7e58d4a7b3b732366a174ebcd1b9afhttps://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/612240This paper explores a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) system consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer is the CLSC Stackelberg leader. We investigate the effect of exerting marketing effort on the optimal decisions and profits of supply chain members by considering several marketing effort supported models, namely the models when the manufacturer is the investor, the retailer is the investor, and the centralized CLSC system, respectively. We propose a two-part tariff contract for coordinating the CLSC. We analytically reveal that the two-part tariff contract can coordinate the CLSC when the manufacturer is the investor but unable to coordinate supply chain when the retailer is the investor. Finally, we present the numerical analysis to uncover insights on how the consumers' preference toward the direct channel affects the optimal decisions in the dual-channel CLSC system. ? 2016 IEEE.Closed-loop supply chain (CLSC); coordination; dual-channel; game theory; marketing effort; two-part tariff contract[SDGs]SDG17Chains; Commerce; Game theory; Manufacture; Marketing; Sales; Closed-loop supply chain; Closed-loop supply chains (CLSC); Consumers' preferences; coordination; Direct channel; Dual channel; Optimal decisions; Two-part tariff contract; Supply chainsjournal article10.1109/TSMC.2016.25948082-s2.0-85040739627