國立臺灣大學政治學系暨研究所吳玉山2006-07-252018-06-282006-07-252018-06-282000-07-31http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/13786俄羅斯在葉爾欽時代(1992-1999)採行 了西方的資本主義經濟改革，但是其總體 經濟表現一直沒有起色。本研究透過政治 經濟學的分析方法，建構出一個分析模 型，用以解釋俄羅斯和其他新興市場經濟 的經濟表現。在此一模型當中，有三個主 要的行為者：主張新古典式經濟改革的國 際金融組織及位於其後的西方國家、反對 資本主義經濟改革所帶來社會成本的國 會、和介於兩者之間的政府。俄羅斯在葉 爾欽時期的政府就是由於處於國際金融組 織（西方）和由反對黨所控制的杜馬國會 兩者之間，承受交叉壓力，因此不論在產 權重構和總體經濟政策方面都搖擺不定， 因而造成總體經濟表現不佳。政府政策的 搖擺是和選舉週期密切相關的。大凡在選 舉之前，由於政府的任期將屆，民意和國 會對於行政部門的影響力就大為增加，而 政府的經濟改革政策就會轉向較為緩和， 總體經濟政策就會趨向擴張，其目的便在 於爭取選民的支持。在選舉過後、下一次 大選之前，由於政府所面臨的國內壓力稍 戢，而經改停滯、總經擴張的政策所帶來 的代價又逐漸顯現，再加上國際上的壓力 也紛至沓來，而政府又無法以選舉為理由 來抗拒西方和國際金融組織的要求，於是 政府的經濟政策又開始大規模轉向。此時 經濟改革的步調會加速，而穩定化的措施 也會加強。於是經改週期和選舉週期就表 現出反向進行的現象。Russia under Boris Yeltsin (1992-1999) made rapid strides towards capitalist economic reform but failed to produce good performance. This study applies the politicoeconomic approach and develops an analytical model to explain economic performance of transitional Russia and other emerging market economies. In the model three main actors are specified: international financial organizations (and their Western sponsors) that advocate orthodox, neo-classic therapy, national parliament that reflects popular opposition to the traumatizing economic reform, and the government that is sandwiched between the above two forces. In Russia, because the Yeltsin government was under cross pressure from the State Duma and international financial organizations and could not produce consistent reform and macro economic policies, the transition economy could not recover promptly and remained stagnant after eight years of capitalist reform. Policy fluctuations in Russia is synchronized with the country’s electoral cycles. When national elections are approaching, the government senses mounting pressure from the society and from the State Duma, and switches to slower reform and expansionary policy to attract votes. After the elections, however, because domestic electoral pressure is temporarily relieved, the economic costs of pre-election policy change become evident, and international pressure is on the rise, the government would then make a policy shift back to reform track and pro-stability macro economic policies. Thus one sees inverse relation between the reform cycles and the electoral cycles.application/pdf80838 bytesapplication/pdfzh-TW國立臺灣大學政治學系暨研究所俄羅斯葉爾欽經濟改革金 融危機新興市場經濟財產權RussiaYeltsineconomic reformfinancial crisisemerging marketsproperty rightsThe interaction among government, par liament, and international financial organizations in emerging markets: the case of the Russian financial cr isisreporthttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/13786/1/892414H002022.pdf