周雍強臺灣大學:工業工程學研究所謝尚樺Hsieh, Shang-HuaShang-HuaHsieh2010-05-032018-06-292010-05-032018-06-292008U0001-2107200813443700http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/178471在兩廠產品品質有差異的雙占市場，正廠產品定位為高品質高價格，副廠則為低品質低價格，兩廠作價格及品質的競爭。正廠的銷售通路為二階層通路（製造商、經銷商和零售商）中，製造商為了防止經銷商採取品牌內競爭行為，破壞企業形象或影響利潤，通常會採用垂直限制策略，如：轉售價格限制策略。然而，採用轉售價格限制策略消除品牌內競爭行為，往往忽略經銷商在市場還必須面對品牌間競爭，誘使它們採取自利決策導致製造商利潤損失。 本研究探討正廠製造商採取轉售價格限制策略無法控制經銷商的投機行為時，製造商採用「內隱控制策略」，預測經銷商行為，將經銷商投機行為納入其定價決策的策略效果。本文建構正廠內隱控制策略之數學模型，首先分析該策略通路內的控制效果，再分析正副廠競爭對該策略的影響。研究發現製造商採用內隱控制策略能訂定均衡的轉售價格，間接控制經銷商的投機行為，兩廠皆能達成最佳利潤。然而，當考慮品牌間競爭，則內隱控制策略不一定有效，經銷商的投機行為有可能使製造商獲利。控制效果受到製造商轉售價格限制策略分給下游的利潤分配比例影響：若製造商分配給經銷商較多利潤，經銷商投機的幅度較低且能防止正副廠品牌在雙占市場採取激烈的價格競爭，此時，放任經銷商採取投機行為能使製造商得到較佳的利益。In the duopoly market, product quality of two firms is different. Price and quality of Name Brand products are higher, and price and quality of Generic Brand products are lower. Name Brand’s channel is two-level, including manufacturer, dealer and retailer. For preventing intra-brand competition in downstream from harming the corporate image or profit, the upstream manufacturer often uses the vertical restraint policy, like Resale Price Maintanence to control the behavior of dealers. However, while eliminating the disadvantage from intra-brand competition, dealers under inter-brand competition could speculate in opportunism. This thesis shows that upstream manufacturers in two-level channel can use “implicit control policy” to control dealer opportunism which RPM can not control when facing inter-brand price and quality competition. Manufacturers must predict dealer’s behavior and embed their opportunistic behavior in its pricing decision. The research develops a mathematical model of brand name’s implicit contorl policy, analyzing the policy’s effect in the channel at first, then considers the effect in inter-brand competition. The results show that manufacturers can make an equilibrium price and indirectly control dealer’s opportunism through “impilcit control policy.” But, results also show that the policy does not always work under inter-brand competition, dealer’s opportunism sometimes helps manufacturer gain more profit. The policy’s effect deppends on profit allocation by RPM : if manufacturers allocate more profit to dealers, dealers’ opportunism is smaller and dealers also prevent severe price competition between brands, manufacturers can make more profit by not controling dealers’ opportunism.中文摘要 Ibstract II錄 III目錄 V目錄 VI一章 緒論 1.1　研究背景與動機 1.2　問題描述 3.3　研究目的 5.4　研究流程 6.5　論文架構 6二章 文獻回顧 8.1　垂直限制策略 8.2　價格與品質競爭之需求函數 14.3　經銷商投機行為 17三章 製造商內隱控制策略模型 20.1　概念架構 20.1.1　需求分配函數 22.1.2　轉售價格限制 23.1.3　經銷商投機幅度函數 24.1.4　小結 24.2　製造商內隱控制策略模型 25.2.1　內隱控制策略 25.2.2　數學求解分析 27.2.3　非線性需求函數對正廠均衡訂價的影響 29.3　特性分析 30.4　數值範例與管理意函 34.4.1　正廠製造商均衡訂價 35.4.2　特性分析與管理意函 36四章 正廠控制策略在品牌間競爭下之效果 40.1　需求分配函數 40.2　正副廠競爭均衡 41.2.1　副廠策略 42.2.2　正廠策略 42.2.3　正副廠競爭均衡 44.3　正廠控制策略之有效性 46.4　數值範例 52五章 結論與貢獻 54.1　研究貢獻 54.2　未來研究方向 55考文獻 57application/pdf833994 bytesapplication/pdfen-US垂直控制策略轉售價格限制投機行為品牌間競爭價格與品質需求函數Vertical ControlResale Price MaintenanceOpportunistic BehaviorInter-Brand CompetitionDemand Function of Price and Qualitythesishttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/178471/1/ntu-97-R95546023-1.pdf