梁孟玉Liang, Meng-Yu臺灣大學:經濟學研究所莊亞涵Chuang, Ya-HanYa-HanChuang2010-05-052018-06-282010-05-052018-06-282009U0001-1607200916535900http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/179510本文旨在分析「樂觀的預期」會如何影響交易時間的延遲。此篇模型先固定交易物品的耐久性，再在這段物品使用期限內，將時間細分許多期。擁有這個耐久財可以享受其所提供的服務，在每一期都得相同效用。買賣雙方對於未來他是否能出價，各自有一個主觀上的定。我們證明在某些情況之下，延遲交易的時間是顯著的。This paper analyze the role of optimism in bargaining delay asildiz(2003) did. Given the life time of the durable goods, owner can obtain the same value every period. Each player may hold his subjective belief about being recognized in the future. We find possibility that delay is significant when bargaining periods grows into infinite.1 Introduction 2 Model 3 Equilibrium 5 Efficiency 9 Conclusion 12 Appendix A 12 Appendix B 14 Reference 15application/pdf333540 bytesapplication/pdfen-US樂觀預期出價耐久財延遲交易optimismbargaining delaydurable goodsrecognizedsubjective beliefthesishttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/179510/1/ntu-98-R96323010-1.pdf