Yen J.-F.Chen Y.-S.Shen C.-H.Lin C.-Y.2019-07-242019-07-24201410590560https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/414652This paper investigates the potential benefits provided by the directorship of CEOs in trade associations. Specifically, we argue that directorship in trade associations enhances the personal connections (social networks) of CEOs, translating into bank loan favors. Empirically, we find that firms with CEOs holding trade association directorships enjoy larger loans, lower rates and longer loan maturities from both privately-owned and government-owned banks. Moreover, firms with CEOs holding directorships in major trade associations enjoy better privileges. These benefits expand during financial crisis. Our results help explain why CEOs prefer holding directorships in trade associations and why well-connected CEOs are paid more. ? 2014 Elsevier Inc.Bank loan contractsCEOFinancial crisisSocial networksTrade associationsjournal article10.1016/j.iref.2014.01.0062-s2.0-84897575521https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84897575521&doi=10.1016%2fj.iref.2014.01.006&partnerID=40&md5=bf4c557541b5052b814a6be8f5e94212