2009-01-012024-05-18https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/697604摘要：過去文獻指出，由於無形資產的會計資訊揭露極度匱乏，導致無形資產密集公司大多具有很高的資訊不對稱，然而卻鮮少有文獻探討哪些機制可以減輕此資訊不對稱的問題。本研究的主要目的在探討誘因機制在減輕資訊揭露代理問題上所扮演的角色，以及誘因與監督機制之間的交互作用。更明確而言，本研究檢視以股份為基礎的獎酬制度與股權持有能否提供高階經理適當的誘因，使其對公司內部無形資產的相關資訊做更多之揭露；再者，本研究亦探討股份誘因機制與公司治理所扮演的監督機制之間，是否具有互補或替代的功能，以促進公司的自願性揭露。 無形資產相關活動已被證實為公司內部非公開資訊的重要來源，本研究將使我們更瞭解公司對內部的無形資產活動提供什麼樣的資訊揭露；本研究亦延伸獎酬制度之文獻，將股份誘因機制與無形資產自願性揭露之間做一連結；由於過去有關公司治理之文獻極少探討監理機制與其他解決代理問題的機制之間是否具有互補或替代作用，本研究藉由探討誘因與監督機制間的相互作用，能彌補過去文獻在這方面的不足。<br> Abstract: Prior literature suggests that intangibles-intensive firms tend to experience significant information asymmetry due to scarce public disclosures about their intangibles. However, there is limited research studying the mechanisms that help mitigate this problem. The primary objective of this study is to investigate the role of incentives in alleviating the disclosure agency problem as well as the interaction effect between incentives and monitoring mechanisms. More specifically, I examine whether stock-based compensation and share ownership provide adequate incentives for CEOs to disclose more information about firm-specific intangibles. In addition, I test whether these stock-based incentives complement or substitute the monitoring role played by the governance structure in enforcing more voluntary disclosures. This study will provide insights on what firms disclose about their intangibles-related activities which are documented to be a significant source of private information. I also augment the compensation literature by establishing the link between stock-based incentives and voluntary disclosures. Moreover, studying the interaction between incentives and monitoring mechanisms contributes to the governance literature in which limited research has considered the complementary or substitution effect provided by alternative mechanisms designed to mitigate the agency problem.無形資產自願性揭露誘因股份獎酬制度股權持有公司治理監督機制intangiblesvoluntary disclosureincentivestock compensationshare ownershipcorporate governancemonitoring mechanism