陳其美2006-07-262018-07-092006-07-262018-07-092005http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/16291This paper studies the relationships among a multi-product in- cumbent rm's business style, its bundling and pricing strategy, and the impacts of these decisions on the design of the nancial contract and the targeting strategy of a new entrant. We show that, unlike in Adams and Yellen (1976), a monopolist may optimally adopt a pure bundling strategy when it is faced with demand uncertainty and costs of disposal for unsold products. We show that in such a monopoly market, depending on consumers' valuation distribution, pure com- ponents and mixed bundling strategies may respectively be optimal for a marketing-oriented rm, but a production-oriented rm tends to prefer a pure bundling strategy. When the incumbent is faced with a potential entrant that is nancially unconstrained and uninformed of the state of demand, pure bundling may appear as the incumbent's optimal strategy because it raises the chance that the entrant may target at the wrong segment, and when the loss of mistargeting is signicant, pure bundling may result in entry deterrence. Moreover, when the potential entrant is nancially constrained, the incumbent's pure bundling strategy can maximize the state verication cost in- curred to the entrant and its nancier, and may help deter entry. We also document a relationship between equilibrium product prices and the entrant's face value of debt.application/pdf321159 bytesapplication/pdfzh-TW國立臺灣大學財務金融學系暨研究所reporthttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/16291/1/932416H002036.pdf