胡星陽臺灣大學：財務金融學研究所李喬志TOBON, JORGE MARIO LEEJORGE MARIO LEETOBON2007-11-282018-07-092007-11-282018-07-092007http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/60782本研究論文驗證了S&P 500公司的不稱職總裁之任期期間的長短，會受到董事聲譽某些程度的影響。 年輕的外部董事在監控總裁的效率方面，比較接近退休年紀的董事好，此現象尤其是以2000年後的樣本期間更為明顯。 而大部分任職多家公司董事會的多重董事，他們以股東的利益為導向的行為較不顯著。 另外，若公司的市場績效表現不佳，董事會將因壓力而解僱掉不稱職的總裁。 即使控制佔三分之一樣本數的受管制公司之變數後，本論文研究結果仍然是成立的.The evidence provided by this research is consistent with the proposition that the tenure of poorly performing CEOs of S&P 500 is determined to some extent by the so-called pure reputation incentives faced by the boards of directors. Young outside directors are found to be more efficient monitors than those near retirement age, especially in the post-2000 period. Most of the directors holding multiple directorships appear to be less shareholder-driven than previous researches have shown. In addition, the market performance of the firm exerts a great pressure on the boards to remove underperforming management. These results hold after controlling for regulated firms, which represent approximately one third of the study sample.Chapter I: Introduction...1 Chapter II: Testable Hypothesis and Control Variables...5 1. Pure Reputation Incentives...8 1.1 Characteristics of Outside Directors...8 1.2 CEO Performance...10 2. Firm Type and Other Board Characteristics...11 Chapter III: Data Sources and Methodology...14 1. Data Sources and Description... 14 1.1 Tenure of Underperforming CEOs and Firm Type...17 1.2 Outside Directors and Other Board Characteristics...19 1.3 CEO Performance...23 2. Matching of Data...24 3. Multivariate Analysis Method...26 Chapter IV: Results...28 Chapter V: Conclusion...34 References...36 Appendix A: Extracts of News Articles on CEO Departures...39 Appendix B: IRRC Definitions of Different Types of Directors...41770381 bytesapplication/pdfen-US董事總裁離職聲譽BOARDSCEODEPARTUREDISMISSALTURNOVERUNDERPERFORMINGREPUTATIONthesishttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/60782/1/ntu-96-R92723073-1.pdf