指導教授：陳聖賢臺灣大學：財務金融學研究所陳柏蓉Chen, Po-JungPo-JungChen2014-11-272018-07-092014-11-272018-07-092014http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/262516本篇以高階經理人更換後再謀職為例，高階經理人若為適度過度自信且自願離職、較年輕、過去績效佳、從大公司離職，較容易在離職後再被其他公司聘為高階經理人。公司具有較好的成長機會和較多的研究發展費用支出，較有可能聘用過度自信的高階經理人。過度自信的高階經理人要求較高的薪資，並且當公司面臨成長機會時會增加公司的投資支出。What happens to CEOs after they turnover? We examine CEOs who can be hired as CEO by another firm after turnover. CEOs with moderately-optimism, who voluntary left from departing firm, younger, better prior performance and from big departing firm are more likely to be hired as CEO by another firm after turnover. Firms with higher growth opportunity and R&D expenditures are willing to hire overconfident CEOs. More optimistic CEOs can receive higher total compensation than less optimistic CEOs. Finally, Overconfident CEOs will increase firm investment while firm with high growth opportunity.Contents Chinese Abstract………………………………………………………i Abstract……………………………………………………………….ii Contents……..……………………………………………………….iii List of Tables……………………………………………………... v 1. Introduction…..…………………………………………….....1 2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development…………...6 2.1 The likelihood for overconfident CEOs who can be hired as CEO of another firm after turnover.………………………..6 2.2 Compensation and overconfident CEO………………………..7 2.3 Investment decision…………………………………………….9 3. Sample and Methodology………………………………………..10 3.1 Sample………………………………………………………….10 3.2 Measuring overconfidence………………………………….11 3.3 Other explanatory variables………………………………14 3.4 Sample distribution and summary statistics………….16 4. Empirical Results……………………………………………….18 4.1 The likelihood for overconfident CEOs who can be hired as CEO of another firm after turnover…………………19 4.2 CEO / firm characteristics and compensation of new hire firm................................................22 4.2.1 Subsample analysis on CEO/firm characteristics of new hire firm……….…………………………………………..22 4.2.2 Regression results of CEO compensation of new hire firm…..............................................25 4.3 Investment decision……………………………………....29 4.3.1 Regression model…………………………..........29 4.3.2 Regression results of overconfident CEO and investment decision......................................30 4.4 Alternative explanations…………...………………....32 4.4.1 Overconfidence and governance…………………….33 4.4.2 Overconfidence and private information…………33 5. Conclusion…………………………………………………………35 Reference………………………………………………………………381060294 bytesapplication/pdf論文使用權限：不同意授權過度自信行為財務學高階經理人薪酬投資決策thesishttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/262516/1/ntu-103-D96723004-1.pdf