李存修2006-07-262018-07-092006-07-262018-07-092003http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/16275專利權之持有人可選擇立即將具專利技術商品化或延後進入市場，因 此實質權之架構來評估專利權之價值。本文另以跳躍擴散模式來推演競爭 者加入對專利權價值的影響，結果不但可以解決Takalo and Kanniainen(2000)之問題，也可驗證Sarkar(2000)之假說：即投資與不確 定性具正向關係。另外本文亦可推論出專利權之保護政策應以提高專利權 價值為目標，而非著眼於對新種技術提供最大保護。The problem of pricing patents is a sequential investment decision. The patent holder can decide to launch new product immediately, or delay to the market introduction. The value of patent option is composed of the patent fee and the lost option value of deferring to patented new product. The numerical results in this paper illustrate the impact of rivalry entry on the value of patent option. Our numerical results not only fill up an open gap found by Takalo and Kanniainen (2000), but also enhance the insight in the paper of Sarkar (2000) that there may be a positive relation between uncertainty and investment.Finally, our model suggests that a policy for the purpose of patent protection should make the value of patent option higher, rather than focus on the maximum protection on new production or technology.application/pdf144542 bytesapplication/pdfzh-TW國立臺灣大學財務金融學系暨研究所專利權實質選擇權PatentReal optionsreporthttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/16275/1/912416H002029.pdf