Chien Y.-HMAO-WEI HUNG2021-08-312021-08-31202010629408https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85083464809&doi=10.1016%2fj.najef.2020.101183&partnerID=40&md5=fa74e5c4ba9011a2d384711bd65dbfachttps://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/579999This paper investigates whether the performance variables of newly added intangible capital elements give the appointment relationship a deeper impact on the firms’ performance and profitability. We document that after correcting for endogeneity, when considering intangible capital, Total Q is a better proxy than Tobin's Q for explaining the effect of appointment-based CEO connectedness on firm performance and profitability. Furthermore, we show that the influence of directors on company performance and profitability is more important than that of executives or managers. We also find that the stronger the appointment relationship, the worse the company's performance and profitability. We further provide a series of alternative interpretations and robustness test evidence showing that intangible capital is more important for high technology and internet firms than industrial firms. Further, we find that the greater the number of executives appointed by the CEO, the better the firm's research and development, but the worse the firm's investment policy. ? 2020 Elsevier Inc.[SDGs]SDG9journal article10.1016/j.najef.2020.1011832-s2.0-85083464809