李怡庭臺灣大學:經濟學研究所張德存Chang, Te-TsunTe-TsunChang2010-05-052018-06-282010-05-052018-06-282008U0001-1807200814340300http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/179283本論文包含兩部份。第二章中, 在一全面均衡架構下,定生產者,官僚及私部門競租者的相對報酬與人才的分配。生產者的活動對於生產來說具有外部性, 因此模型具有多重均衡,個均衡的政府規模大小也不同。果私部門競租者占總人口數的比例是固定的話,小的政府規模確有較高的社會福利。果私部門競租者占總人口數的比例是內生決定的話, 外部性效果會加大,較大的政府規模確有較高的社會福利。我們的分析支持政府規模大小並不重要;要的是政府品質。第三章和第四章中我們根據 Lagos and Wright2005)的模型並加入金融中介部門來探討短期的貨幣傳遞機制。完美的信用市場架構下,幣注入只會影響通貨膨脹率但不會影響實質面。處在不完美的信用市場,行因考慮貸款人不履行契約之情形而會產生借貸限制的情形,而造成金融中介的成本。時貨幣注入銀行體系會減少資金成本而使利率下降, 進而增加消費,即有流動性效果(Liquidity Effect)的產生。果考慮使用支票交易的經濟體系, 貨幣注入銀行體系依舊會使利率下降,可能使消費減少, 因為利率下降亦會產生負的財富效果。The thesis consists of two parts. We first determine the relative rewards to and allocation of talent between producers, private rent-seekers and bureaucrats in a general equilibrium model.Unproductive activity creates a negative externality on the relative rewards to producers. Multiple equilibria exist that differ in the size of bureaucracy. If private rent-seeking is exogenously given,the equilibrium with a smaller bureaucracyields higher welfare. If private rent-seeking is endogenously determined, the externality is strengthened, necessitating a larger bureaucracy. The size of government and economic performance are jointly determined, and their relationship is not necessarily negative. Our result supports the view that the size of government does not matter much; what is important is the quality of government.n next two chapters, we construct a model based on Lagos and Wright (2005) by incorporating financial intermediation to study the monetary transmission mechanism. With full enforcement, money injections only affects inflation but not real course of economy. With limited enforcement, there is a loan constraint, a cost on the intermediation process. Monetary injections through banks reduce the cost and thus induce a liquidity effect. If agents canse checks as a means of payment, however, the consumption mayall: since consumption depends on the total value of portfolio,hich decreases as interest rates do.口試委員會審定書i謝ii要iiibstract ivists of Figures viists of Tables vii Introduction 1.1 Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Quality of Government and Economic Performance 6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3 Exogenous Private Rent-seeking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.3.1 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.3.2 Government Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.4 Endogenous Private Rent-seeking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.4.1 Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.4.2 The Size of Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27.6 Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Bank Lending, Liquidity and Monetary Policy 37.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37.2 The environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40.3 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43.3.1 Equilibrium with Full Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50.3.2 Equilibrium with Limited Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . 53.4 Liquidity Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54.5 Taylor Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.6 Equilibrium Without Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63.8 Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 Multiple Means of Payment and Monetary Transmission Mechanism3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74.3 Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 Conclusion 85application/pdf815564 bytesapplication/pdfen-US競租政府品質政府大小流動性效果泰勒法則支付工具Rent-seekingQuality of GovernmentSize of GovernmentLiquidity effectTaylor Rulemeans of paymentthesishttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/179283/1/ntu-97-D91323004-1.pdf