周雍強Chou, Yon-Chun臺灣大學:工業工程學研究所許金吉Caw, Eunice SyEunice SyCaw2010-05-032018-06-292010-05-032018-06-292008U0001-1306200811404900http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/178469本研究發展一種考慮到零售商服務努力的數量折扣激勵政策。在觀察製造商-零售商-顧客行為和相互作用下,提出考慮價格和服務競爭的數量折扣建議。折扣政策建立在以下情況,單一的副廠牌產品製造商與不同規模零售商,處於非獨家分銷通路中,當中每一個擁有正廠品牌和副廠品牌的替換零件零售商會面臨對價格和服務敏感的需求。 強調規模較小的中小型零售商重要性,在其製造商可以採用數量折扣激勵個別中小型零售商,使其貢獻銷售努力使客戶轉移偏好發生。結果表明,當製造商考慮零售商的努力,想建立一個數量折扣政策,和預先承諾一組不同零售商的批發價格時,在具凹性的利潤函數條件下,能產生一個最佳的解決方案。通過修改其折扣政策,製造商是可以利用小型零售商對個人服務靈活性的固有特點,同時達到價格和服務效果的優勢。此外,零售商收入會較大,副廠牌製造商也能改善整體盈利和客戶對其產品的觀感。This study develops an incentive policy in the form of quantity discount that takes into consideration retailer service efforts. In observing the behavior and interaction of manufacturer–retailers–customers, a quantity discount under price and service competition is proposed. The discount policy is constructed under a non-exclusive territory distribution channel of Generic Brand products with a single manufacturer and differently-sized heterogeneous retailers. Each retailer faces price and service sensitive demand in carrying both Name Brand and Generic Brand replacement parts. The importance of smaller-sized retailers is acknowledged and manufacturers discretely allow quantity discount incentive in motivating its retailers to provide an appropriate contribution for customer satisfaction or preference shifting. It was shown that when the manufacturer considers retailer effort in establishing a quantity discount policy and it pre-commits its wholesale prices to a set of heterogeneous retailers, an optimum solution can be determined under concave profit function conditions. By modifying its discount policy, the manufacturer is able to target both price and service effects as well as take advantage of an inherent characteristic of small retailers which is flexibility in personal services. In addition to larger earnings of retailers, Generic Brand manufacturers also realize improved overall profits and customer perception on its products.Oral Defense Committee icknowledgement iibstract iiibstract (Chinese) ivable of Contents vist of Figures viiist of Tables viii hapter 1 Introduction 1.1 Background & Motivation 2.2 Problem Definition 5.3 Research Objectives 7.4 Scope and Limitation 8.5 Thesis Structure 8hapter 2 Literature Review 9.1 Generic Brand Retailing 10.2 Incentive Policies with Sales Effort Effect 14.3 Retailer Service Efforts 18.4 Quantity Discounts 22.5 Points of Departure 26hapter 3 Model Formulation 28.1 Model Framework 28.2 Firm Size and Order Quantity Compatibility 31.3 Linear Quantity Discount 32.4 Average Effort and Firm Size 34.5 Demand Allocation 35.6 Incentive Design Policy 37.6.1 Manufacturer Profit 37.6.2 Profit Function Analysis 39.6.3 Optimum Discount Policy 41hapter 4 Numerical Results 44.1 Discount Policy under Price Competition 45.2 Discount Policy under Price and Service Competition 47.3 Sensitivity Analysis on Competition Intensity Parameters 50hapter 5 Conclusion 52.1 Managerial Implications 52.2 Contributions 53.3 Suggestions for Future Studies 53eference 54ppendix 59application/pdf1076017 bytesapplication/pdfen-US副廠牌數量折扣激勵政策零售商的努力價格與服務競爭Generic BrandsQuantity DiscountIncentivesSales EffortPrice and Service Competition價格與服務競爭考量下的數量折扣-副廠對零售商的努力激勵政策Quantity Discount under Price and Service Competition – A Generic Brand Incentive Policy for Retailer Effortsthesishttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/178469/1/ntu-97-R94546031-1.pdf