國立臺灣大學經濟學系暨研究所宋玉生2006-07-262018-06-282006-07-262018-06-282002http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/18669In this essay we analyze the interplay between regulatory goals of the EPA and selfreporting decisions of regulated polluting firms. We first consider the case of a bureaucratic EPA that aims at maximizing fine revenues,sub ject to costly enforcement and linear fine structure. It is shown that,in equilibrium, no inspection is worthwhile if a firm’s reported emission exceeds a certain threshold level. As a result,a ll firms with actual emissions higher than this level will falsely report exactly this amount. As for firms reporting emission levels below this cut-off level,the EPA will randomly inspect them with a probability just high enough to discourage dishonesty. Alternatively,if the EPA is concerned with reporting compliance,a uniform audit policy should be adopted to induce full honesty. Interestingly,b oth EPA objectives will generate identical net expected revenues. But in equilibrium,firms will incur more tax payment in the case of a compliance-oriented regulator. Total inspection costs will be higher as well. In this regard,our model suggests that revenue maximization is socially preferred to compliance maximization in terms of social costs saved. (JEL classification: H26, Q28, D82)application/pdf121637 bytesapplication/pdfzh-TW國立臺灣大學經濟學系暨研究所Enforcementco mplianceself -reportingreporthttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/18669/1/902415H002016.pdf