郝培芝臺灣大學：國家發展研究所馬廷Hehenberger, MartinMartinHehenberger2007-11-272018-06-282007-11-272018-06-282007http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/57004許多國家及政府間組織在發生1989年六月四日中國政府人民解放軍在北京天安門廣場的大屠殺後,都先後發起制裁中國政府的動作, 包括歐盟. 事實上, 今日所指的歐盟對中國的武器禁運其實屬於1989年對中國提出的制裁中其中一條. 然而,弔詭的是, 這個所謂的武器禁運制裁並不是建構在一般認知的超級強國律法架構下, 也沒有伴隨訂定所需採取的任何必要手段,或是明定透過任何組織的強力執行來成功達成. 因此實質上並未影響或限制到歐盟對中國的武器輸出. 解除這個似是而非的武器禁運制裁成為2003年至2005年間國際政治非常重要的一個議題. 本論文主要發現之一即是武器禁運制裁條文本身, 是不足夠執行的. 而這個發現是根據歐洲國家從本條文開始實施後輸出中國武器的數據, 持續的不減反增所得來的結論. 另外也發現, 對中國的武器禁運制裁不論在政治或法律層面, 實施效力都低於現行的歐盟武器輸出實體及其制定之規範. 甚而, 分析歐盟的政治及法律的整合, 以及因而發展的縝密制裁制度, 比較對中國武器禁運制裁從1989年以後就沒有任何文字的修正或是被賦予律法上的合法性, 就可以看出歐盟從未真正認真看待,或有意實施此武器禁運制裁. 這其中的原因, 從近來中國跟歐盟間蓬勃發展的經濟交流,以及未來目標發展雙贏的策略夥伴關係中不難看出. 歐盟廢除對中國武器輸出制裁的想法, 原意單純只是希望藉此表達歐盟對於跟中國間的貿易交流, 願意秉棄不平等的制裁方式, 改採取平等的夥伴方式對待. 然由於中國長期打壓人權, 積極軍事部署, 以及對台灣的威脅, 許多國家對於歐盟這樣的做法提出質疑. 也因此歐盟廢除對中國武器輸出制裁的議題, 成為國際政治上一個主要但敏感的議題, 歐盟本身也備感壓力. 然而最主要因為美國的介入, 以及中國對台灣的反獨立條款, 這個武器輸出制裁的廢除被無限期延長.Following the massacre of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army on the Tiananmen Square in June 4, 1989, several countries and inter-governmental organizations implemented sanctions on the People’s Republic of China to condemn China’s behavior, among those was also the European Community. It is one sentence in a one-page political declaration from 1989 that is today referred to as the European Union’s arms embargo on China. Contrary to common belief, this so called embargo is neither legally binding under the supra-national framework of the European Union, nor is it accompanied by any of the measures or institutions needed to make an embargo successful. It therefore does not limit the sales of European arms to China. Although seemingly paradoxical, the plan to lift the embargo became a major international political issue in the period from late 2003 until early 2005. One of the main findings of this thesis, that the arms embargo itself is not efficient, was based on data related to the export of European arms to China, showing that those arms sales have continuously increased since its implementation. Furthermore, it was shown that the arms embargo on China is, politically and legally, overruled by the EU’s current arms export control regime, including the Code of Conduct. That the European Union never had the will to actually enforce this embargo was demonstrated by analyzing the EU’s political and legal integration, and the development of a sophisticated sanction system, while in contrast showing that the arms embargo on China has, since 1989, never been changed in its wording or given legal basis. The reasons for this can be found in the increasing economic interdependence between China and the EU, and the aim to develop a mutually beneficial strategic partnership. The plan to lift the embargo was meant to signal the willingness of the EU to treat China as an equal partner, and not to deal with it through measures like sanctions. However, this message was interpreted differently by a large part of the international community, many countries stating concerns about China’s human rights record, its military buildup, and the increasing threat towards Taiwan. The issue of lifting the embargo suddenly received major international attention, increasing the political weight of the embargo itself and thereby also the pressure on the European Union. Mainly due to US intervention and China’s adoption of the Anti-Secession Law against Taiwan, the lifting of the embargo was postponed indefinitely.Table of Content Abstract (Chinese) ………………………………………………………………………………i Abstract (English) ……………………………………………………………………………...iii Tables and graphs …………………………………………………………………………….viii Abbreviations …………………………………………………………………………………..ix Introduction …………………………………………… ………………………….......1 1.1 Purpose of study …………………………………………………………………………….1 1.2 Research questions and hypothesis …………………………………………………………3 1.3 Research methods and procedures ………………………………………………………….4 2. Tiananmen, implementation of the embargo and its legal background ……….11 2.1 Tiananmen …………………………………………………………………………………11 2.2 International reactions …………………………………………………………………….13 2.3 Implementation of the embargo in 1989 and its scope ……………………………………14 2.4 Legal background of the embargo in 1989 ………………………………………………..15 3. European Union sanctions and restrictive measures vs. the arms embargo on China ……………………………………………………………………………18 3.1 General background on international sanctions …………………………………………..18 3.2 Development of the EU’s common foreign and security policy ………………………….21 3.3 The European Union’s policy on sanctions and restrictive measures ……………………..24 3.4 Legal basis of EU embargos ………………………………………………………………27 3.5 The European Union’s arms export control regime ………………………………………28 3.5.1 Common position on the control of arms brokering …………………………………28 3.5.2 Council regulation (EC) No 1236/2005 ………………………………………………29 3.5.3 Dual-use goods, the dual-use export control system, and high-tech trade ……………30 3.5.4 The Code of Conduct on arms exports ……………………………………………….31 4. European Union Member States’ arms exports to China ………………………35 4.1 Interpretation of the embargo by EU Member States from 1989 to present ………………35 4.2 EU Member States evading arms embargos ………………………………………………37 4.3 European arms exports to China in the nineties …………………………………………...38 4.4 European arms exports to China since 2001 ………………………………………………41 4.5 Transfer of military relevant dual use technology …………………………………………49 5. The European Union’s perspectives and the debate on lifting the embargo ………………………………………………………………………..51 5.1 Political motivations: the EU’s perspective on China and its China policy ……………….51 5.2 Strategic interests in China: the European Unions defense and security policy …………..54 5.3 Commercial interests: EU-China trade relations ………………………………………….56 5.4 Concerns of the European Union ………………………………………………………….58 5.4.1 China’s military buildup ……………………………………………………………...58 5.4.2 The human rights situation in China ………………………………………………….61 5.5 The European Union’s arms industry ……………………………………………………...63 5.6 Chronology and turning points of the discussion within the EU ………………………….64 5.6.1 First approaches in the late nineties ………………………………….…… ………….65 5.6.2 The start of the EU-wide discussion …………………………… …………………….66 5.6.3 Towards lifting the embargo …………………………….…… ………………………67 5.6.4 The shift of Britain ……………………………………… ……………………………73 5.6.5 Anti-Secession law and EU-wide shift ……………………………………………….75 5.6.6 The present situation ……………………………………………… ………………….78 5.7 The European Union’s Institutions: Commission and Parliament …………………………79 6. The international discussion of the arms embargo and on related aspects of China’s development …………………………………………………..84 6.1 The most commonly discussed concerns of the international community ………………..84 6.2 Position of the USA ……………………………………………………………………….91 6.3 Taiwan, Japan, Korea ...........................................................................................................97 6.4 Australia, Russia and Israel ………………………………………………………………..98 6.5 China’s perspective ………………………………………………………………………..99 7. Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………..104 References …………………………………………………………………………………109 Appendix ……………………………………………………………………………128652620 bytesapplication/pdfen-US國際制裁武器禁運歐盟與中國關係歐盟外交政策國際安全international sanctionsarms embargoEU-China relationsEU foreign policyinternational securitythesishttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/57004/1/ntu-96-R93341067-1.pdf