蔡信安臺灣大學：哲學研究所蔡宜珍2007-11-272018-05-292007-11-272018-05-292004http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/56402本篇論文目的在於釐清休姆道德的主張。嘗試從道德德行之分類，追溯道德的原則，企圖從正義與仁慈的論述，耙梳道德判斷的根據。並且在刻劃休姆道德理論之輪廓後，對休姆道德語言的使用與分類，以及道德判斷的客觀性，作一分析與討論。 第一章討論理性與情感在道德判斷中各自扮演的角色，指出情感為主理性為輔的合作關係，並且帶出特殊道德感在判斷道德善惡的機制。亦於此章中，分析來自人性原始結構的善惡與德惡，指出道德現象乃是出於人性，而非架空於宗教或其他權威。第二章論證正義與仁慈被視為德行的種種因素。包括動機理論、協議、自私與有限慷慨，以及愛恨情感，還有反映心靈的同情作用，這些都是使一種品質被視為德行的關鍵因素。這兩章的討論，乃是對休姆道德理論作一鋪陳與整理，以「利他傾向」貫穿德行與原則之關係。 第三章針對休姆德行劃分之妥當性提出批評，尤其集中於個人價值的四種分類。並以戴維和佛德拉斯卡的正反意見，論證休姆道德語言的使用在建構道德體系上是否成央C最後一章，討論明智的旁觀者對道德判斷客觀性的建設性，以修正後的公正、穩固的立場，回應訴諸情感的道德判斷所面臨的主觀與任意性質疑。最後對明智的旁觀者所延伸出來的爭議，作一介紹。The purpose of this thesis is to analyze and clarify Hume’s moral theory. Through the examination of his classification of moral virtues, I try to find out the moral principle on which these virtues depended. From the discussion of justice and benevolence, I try to present the foundation of moral judgments. Furthermore, after drawing the outline of Hume’s moral theory, I will analyze the moral language used by him and discuss the objectivity of moral judgments in his theory. In the first chapter, I point out his explanations of the roles of reason and passion in moral judgments ( passion is primary and reason is secondary) and consider the function of the particular sentiment of morals. Also, in this chapter, I analyze good and evil and virtue and vice from the original structure of human nature. Hume contends that moral phenomena emerge from human nature, not from religions or other authorities. In the second chapter, I elaborate the reason why justice and benevolence are virtuous. Including motive theory, convention, selfishness, limited generosity, love, hatred, and sympathy, all of these are the essential factors which can make certain qualities being considered as virtues. The above two chapters show that Hume’s moral philosophy is the “altruistic tendency” since virtues including sympathy are fundamentally connected with moral principles. The third chapter focuses on the reflections on the suitableness of Hume’s classification of virtues, especially on the four classes of Personal Merit. I adopt Davie and Vodraska’s debates to argue whether Hume has successfully employed moral language to construct his moral system. The last chapter discusses the Judicious Spectator. Hume employs the Judicious Spectator and its extending concept, “the corrected position,” to enforce his moral theory. Every moral agent will correct his own point of view to stand on the same position to make the same judgment with other “judicious spectators.” So, he could avoid the criticism of subjectivity and arbitrariness. Finally, I also state the concept of the Judicious Spectator and its relevant controversial issues to reveal my doubts of his solution.前 言………………………………………………………………………1 第一章 道德起源：人性、德行與善惡……………………………5 第一節 理性與激情…………………………………………………6 一、理性：道德的區別不是從理性得來的…………………………6 二、道德感：道德的區別是由道德感得來的………………………12 三、理性與激情的分工合作…………………………………………17 第二節 來自人性的善惡、德惡劃分………………………………20 一、善與惡……………………………………………………………20 二、德與惡……………………………………………………………23 結 論…………………………………………………………………27 第二章 道德原則：正義與仁慈……………………………………29 第一節 正義…………………………………………………………30 一、動機理論…………………………………………………………30 二、正義之起源………………………………………………………33 三、正義之德…………………………………………………………36 第二節 仁慈…………………………………………………………38 一、自愛、自私與仁慈………………………………………………38 二、愛恨與仁慈………………………………………………………41 三、憐憫、惡意與仁慈………………………………………………43 第三節 同情作用……………………………………………………44 一、同情作用的運作過程……………………………………………45 二、同情作用在道德系統的角色……………………………………48 結 論…………………………………………………………………50 第三章 道德實踐：完美的人格……………………………………53 第一節 個人價值……………………………………………………55 一、對我們自己有用的品質…………………………………………56 二、直接令我們自己愉快的品質……………………………………58 三、直接令他人愉快的品質…………………………………………60 四、對他人有用的品質………………………………………………62 五、兩個疑問…………………………………………………………63 第二節 戴維和佛德拉斯卡的分析......................................................65 一、戴維的〈休姆的善惡分類目錄〉………………………………66 二、佛德拉斯卡的〈休姆的道德探究：對目錄的分析〉…………69 三、綜合討論…………………………………………………………76 結 論…………………………………………………………………77 第四章 衝突與道德解決：明智的旁觀者…………………………79 第一節 旁觀者………………………………………………………79 一、明智的旁觀者……………………………………………………80 二、在窮困中，德仍是德……………………………………………85 三、道德評價之特性…………………………………………………90 第二節 明智的旁觀者的道德角色…………………………………92 一、明智的旁觀者握有德行決定權…………………………………92 二、無所不知的明智的旁觀者………………………………………94 三、旁觀者角色的重疊………………………………………………95 四、自私者的德行……………………………………………………95 結 論…………………………………………………………………96 結 論…………………………………………………………………97 參考書目………………………………………………………………101 謝 辭………………………………………………………………105703085 bytesapplication/pdfen-US個人價值明智的旁觀者同情作用仁慈正義協議道德情感道德感justicethe sentiment of moraljudicious spectatorpassionsbenevolencemoralsympathypersonal meritconventionthesishttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/56402/1/ntu-93-R89124001-1.pdf