Wang M.Liu K.TSAN MING CHOIYue X.2022-05-302022-05-302015https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84970003087&doi=10.1109%2fTSMC.2015.2411577&partnerID=40&md5=0239ccb52e5fd849d2d3bbb8ec94f4fehttps://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/612300In this paper, we analyze how carbon emissions affect the selection of transportation modes and social welfare by using a two-stage Stackelberg gaming model. Based on this model, the government's optimal carbon-emission tax scheme and the company's optimal transportation mode and production decisions are explored. We find that: 1) whether or not the transport carbon-emission tax can increase social welfare depends on the relationships among the social cost of carbon (SCC), the transportation mode shifting threshold (TMST), and the biggest carbon-emission tax that a company can afford (BCRA); 2) a greater SCC implies a higher probability of improving social welfare via imposing transportation carbon-emission tax; and 3) a smaller TMST or BCRA yields a higher probability of improving social welfare when a carbon-emission tax is imposed. Further study shows that imposing a carbon-emission tax on the product with a higher production cost, a bigger product volume, or a bigger product density can increase the probability of improving social welfare. ? 2015 IEEE.Carbon-emission tax; economic systems; social welfare; supply chain management; sustainability; Transportation mode selectionCosts; Probability; Supply chain management; Sustainable development; Taxation; Carbon emissions; Economic system; Optimal transportations; Production cost; Production decisions; Social cost of carbon; Social welfare; Transportation mode; Carbonjournal article10.1109/TSMC.2015.24115772-s2.0-84970003087