臺灣大學: 工業工程學研究所洪一薰羅俊豪Lo, Chon-HouChon-HouLo2013-03-292018-06-292013-03-292018-06-292011http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/254677近年來，廢棄電子產品的數量急上升，在環保法令的規範下，製造商必須對電子產品由生產至棄置的流程負責，因此，為確保回收的工作更有效率，許多企業會委託第三方物流(Third-party Logistics)業者來分擔部分或全部廢棄電子產品的回收處理工作。本研究針對回收廢棄電子產品的逆向供應鏈，建構兩階段(Two-tier)廢棄電子產品回收系統，在此模型中，製造商為領導者(Leader)，第三方物流業者為跟隨者(Follower)，探討在製造商與第三方物流業者的目標皆為利潤極大化，以及考量大量客製化程度作為影響廢棄產品利潤因素的情況下，製造商如何訂定最適的契約金額來給予第三物流業者。再者，製造商透過契約的訂定，來影響所處理的廢棄產品的比例。此外，本研究探討第三方物流業者在契約金的影響下，如何訂定給予顧客的最適獎勵金。接著，本研究就最佳決策做適切的討論分析，並且賦予模型合理之經濟意涵。The volume of waste electrical and electronic product increases rapidly in recent years. Due to eco-awareness and legislative requirements, manufacturers have to take the responsibility of recycling their own brand-name products. Many enterprises cooperate with third-party logistics service providers to bear responsibilities for part (or all) of recycling operations of waste electrical and electronic products. For simplicity, we initially consider a two-tier supply chain for e-scrap in a reverse supply chain. Our model consists of a manufacturer, as a leader, and a third-party logistics service provider, as a follower. Each supply chain member maximizes its own profit functions. We consider that recycled product unit profit affected by mass customization index. This research derives the optimal contract rent for the third-party logistics service provider and the optimal reward money for customers. Then, we discuss the impact of the change in the average range of mass customization index, the collection effort and both firms’ unit profit on return rate, the proportion of processed products, the profit of manufacturer (or third-party logistics service providers) and total profit in the recycling system.1077983 bytesapplication/pdfen-US逆向供應鏈第三方物流回收大量客製化reverse supply chainthird-party logisticsrecyclemass customization[SDGs]SDG11thesishttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/254677/1/ntu-100-R98546004-1.pdf