Department of Economics, National Taiwan University國立臺灣大學經濟學系宋玉生2017-09-082018-06-282017-09-082018-06-281998-12http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/282194http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/282194/1/index.htmlPrivate contribution to continuous public goods has been an area of extensive study in public economics. Most researchers, however, analyzed simultaneous-move contribution games. A notable exception is Varian (1994), who considers a Stackelberg game for the classical additive type of public goods. The main finding of Varian is that total contribution in a simultaneous-move Nash game is at least as large as that under a sequential setting. In this paper, we characterize both Nash and Stackelberg equilibria under the alternative public-good composition rules of weakestlink and best-shot. We claim that Varian's conclusion does not hold in these cases. For weakest-link public goods, Stackelberg outcome is found to be no less than its Nash counterpart, so Varian's conclusion is reversed. In the best-shot case, either setting may yield higher total public good supply than the other, due to a multiplicity of Nash equilibria and variations in Stackelbherg contribution sequences.傳統公共財文獻中對私人捐獻之分析多考慮 Nash 均衡，亦即假設各人之捐獻行動皆同時發生。Varian （ 1994 ）首開先河，探討眾人捐獻有先後之循序 Stackelberg 賽局。 其主要發現強調循序均衡下之公共財總量必不會高於同時捐獻時之總量。 本文則說明 Varian 之結論僅適用於加總性公共財之情形。 當眾人之捐獻為完全互補（亦即公共財之組成方式為最弱環）時，循序均衡下之公共財總量必不低於同時捐獻時之總量；故 Varian 之結論在此例下恰為相反。其次，當公共財之組成由各捐獻量之最高者所決定（即最強棒式之公共財）時，循序均衡下之公共財總量將視眾人之捐獻順序而定，而同時捐獻賽局則將有多重均衡；因此兩者之高低並無定論。159 bytestext/html公共財循序捐獻同時捐獻最弱環最強棒Public goodStackelberg gameWeakest-linkBest-shotjournal articlehttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/282194/1/index.html