2017-08-012024-05-18https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/702796摘要：策略結盟可以藉由提供資訊與資源獲得競爭優勢，同時也減少環境上的不確定性。在網絡研究中，合作夥伴的選擇受到學者高度重視，因為策略聯盟的價值來自選擇合適的夥伴、設計適當的聯盟設計以及妥適地管理團隊關係。企業需要辨認並選擇可以提供重要且互補的資源的夥伴以提升績效表現。 在夥伴選擇上，市場的不確定性是個重要的因素。市場不確定指的是無法由單一企業掌控的改變，該項改變頻繁且不可預測。學者發現市場不確定可能源自不完整的市場資訊、來自對手的競爭壓力、產業之產品或服務的不確定需求、投入成本的不確定以及總體經濟震盪等外生性因素。在研究策略結盟時，了解上述不確定因素實為重要，因其將影響企業尋找夥伴的範圍以及其偏好的夥伴性質。 然而，學者對企業如何於高度不確定發展策略結盟提出了不一致的看法。大部分的學者指出當市場處於高度不確定時，企業會傾向以現有的夥伴以擴展新的夥伴關係。因為企業對於新夥伴的攸關資訊之獲得以及其效用之評估有其困難性，企業不願去承擔高額的成本找尋新的聯盟夥伴。相反地，來自Beckman et al(2004)對美國前端企業之夥伴選擇的研究中發現，由於周遭環境隨時在變化，企業同時不斷改變其網絡策略來適應新環境，因此前述之論點並不適用於不同時段。 對於高度不確定市場中的結盟策略有不同的看法可能歸因於研究者並未注意到特殊情況，特別是公司所處的制度環境。近來的網絡研究指出企業之網略策略會隨著不同國家的制度環境而有所不同。研究者發現企業夥伴的選擇取決於國家機構發展的穩定性以及制度的特色。如果不同的國家機構在戰略發展上屬重要，企業對市場不確性的反應可能因國家機構的不同而異。 在本篇研究中，借鑑網絡以及制度背景與組織學習的研究，我們將比較不同制度背景下（美國與歐洲國家）於金融危機前後企業聯盟的形成情形。在汽車市場中，美國是市場有效的國家代表，而歐洲則是代表保護主義。本篇的論點為於金融危機後，前者將加強企業結盟，而後者則否。會產生這樣的結果是因為當面對高度市場的不確定時，美國政府追求市場效率因而形塑出追求冒險與探索心態的管理者以促進策略結盟。相反地，在不確定市場的情況下，歐洲政府的保護主義將會使企業對結盟產生被動其風險趨避的心態。本篇認為企業對市場不確定性的策略取決於制度背景，特別是政府市場政策。 <br> Abstract: Strategic alliances are important source of competitive advantage by providing resources, information and learning as well as reducing environmental uncertainty. In network research, partner selection receives great attention from scholars because the value of strategic alliances is derived by selecting the right partner, designing suitable alliance design and managing partnership appropriately. Firms must identify and select the partners which can provide critical and complementary resources and enhance performance. In partner selection, market uncertainty is a key consideration. Market uncertainty refers to frequent and unpredictable changes which cannot be controlled by a single firm. Scholars find that market uncertainty can result from incomplete knowledge about market, competitive pressure of rivals, and demand uncertainty about industry product/service, input cost uncertainty and exogenous macro-economic shock. Knowing the influence of market uncertainty is important in studying strategic alliance because it affects firms’ mindset about the scope of partner search and the type of preferable partner. In turn, facing market uncertainty, managers’ mindset about potential partners bring different outcomes in partner selection. In spite of importance of market uncertainty in partner selection, scholars provide mixed findings about how firms develop alliance strategy in highly uncertain environment. Most scholars suggest that when market uncertainty is high, firms prefer reiterating existing partners to expanding new partnership. Because firms have difficulty in obtaining relevant and consistent information or assessing the usefulness of new partners, firms do not want to bear high search cost for finding new alliance partners. On the contrary, in the replication study about Beckman et al(2004)’s partner selection in the U.S. top firms, researchers find the above arguments do not hold in different time period because surrounding environment changes over time and firms adapt to the new environment by changing their network strategy. Such mixed findings about firms’ alliance strategy in highly uncertain market may attribute to the fact that researchers did not pay attention to contingencies, specifically institutional context where firms are embedded. Recent network research suggests that firms’ network strategies can vary depending on heterogeneous national institutional contexts. In cross-sectional studies, researchers present that firms’ partner selection varies depending on the stability of national institutional development in each country and institutional characteristics. If different national institutions matters in network strategy, firms’ reaction to market uncertainty in forging alliance can vary depending on heterogeneous national institutions. In this study, drawing upon network research, studies about institutional context and organization learning, we will compare firms’ alliance formation during pre- and post- financial crisis across different institutional contexts(U.S. vs. European countries). Empirically, U.S. represents market-efficiency country, and European countries represent protectionism countries in automobile industry. Our argument is that during post-financial crisis, U.S. automobile firms will increase strategic alliances whereas European automobile firms will not. This happens because facing high market uncertainty, U.S. government’s drive for market-efficiency will shape risk-taking and explorative mindset of managers and facilitate strategic alliances. On the contrary, facing high market uncertainty, European governments’ protectionism will lead firms to passive and risk-adverse mindset about alliance. We argue that firms’ strategic reaction to market uncertainty depends on institutional context, particularly, governments’ market policy.金融危機市場不確定政府政策聯盟形成汽車產業Financial crisismarket uncertaintygovernment policiesalliance formationautomobile industry