2006-08-012024-05-18https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/708426摘要：本計畫將研究知覺哲學（philosophy of perception）的核心問題：我們能否直接知覺到外在世界？此即著名的知覺問題（the problem of perception）。根據直接實在論（Direct Realism），感官經驗至少在有些時候提供我們對於外在世界之直接且立即的識察（awareness）。但這符合日常直覺的觀點遭受到錯覺論證（the Argument from Illusion）以及幻覺論證（the Argument from Hallucination）的強烈威脅。在這兩年的計畫裏（2006 & 2007），我打算探討兩組議題，概要如下：第一組是關於我們能否訴諸於知覺的某些現象學上的特性（phenomenological features of perception），例如：知覺恆常性（perceptual constancy），來為直接實在論辯護。這些特性有部分是涉及到「知覺的意向性」（intentionality of perception）以及「認知者能對同一物體採取不同的知覺觀點」這兩者之間的關係。第二組議題：有些重要的直接實在論者也同時主張關於知<br> Abstract: This project investigates a central problem in the philosophy of perception: Can we directly perceive the external world? This is called “the problem of perception.” According to Direct Realism, perception provides direct and immediate awareness of reality, at least sometimes. But this intuitive view has been seriously threatened by the Argument from Illusion and the Argument from Hallucination. In this two-year project (2006 & 2007) I intend to address two sets of issues that can be summarized as follows: (1) Can Direct Realism be defended by appealing to some phenomenological features of perception, for example, perceptual constancy? Some of these features involve the relation between the nature of perceptual intentionality, on the one hand, and the possibility of the subject’s having different perceptual perspectives on the same object, on the other hand. (2) It is noteworthy that some prominent direct realists also advocate Conceptualism and Disjunctivism. Like Direct Realism, these two theories are philosophical views regarding the intentionality of perception. But what exactly are the connections between them and Direct Realism? Are they able to provide strong arguments for defending Direct Realism? By examining these issues, I will propose my own position on the problem of perception.直接實在論知覺意向性Direct RealismPerceptionIntentionality