魏宏宇Wei, Hung-Yu臺灣大學:電信工程學研究所柯君翰Ko, Chun-HanChun-HanKo2010-07-012018-07-052010-07-012018-07-052009U0001-1407200900151800http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/188294IEEE 802.22 is the first cognitive-radio-based wireless communication standard. We propose a spectrum transaction scheme for dynamic resource renting and offering (DRRO) and adaptive on demand channel contention (AODCC) in IEEE 802.22 inter-BS coexistence mechanismto achieve efficient and fair spectrum sharing. Game theory is applied to formulate and analyze the proposed spectrum sharing algorithm. We first analyze the simplest two-basestation (BS) game through a graphical method to gain insights for the solution. Then, the Nash Equilibrium of the n-BS game is derived and the utility profile at the Nash equilibrium is shown to be unique. We prove several desirable properties, including allocative efficiency, Pareto optimality, weighted max-min fairness, and weighted proportional fairness, are attainedt the Nash equilibrium. Lastly, we design a strategy-proof spectrum allocation mechanism based on the proposed spectrum sharing algorithm so that truthful strategies optimize each BS''s performance.Contentsaster Thesis Certification by Oral Defense Committee ihinese Abstract iibstract iii Introduction 1.1 IEEE 802.22 Inter-BS Coexistence Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 RelatedWork . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Spectrum Sharing Scheme 5.1 SystemModel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 SpectrumSharingAlgorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 ProblemDescription . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Game Formulation 10.1 GameTheory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.2 SpectrumSharingGame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Graphical Analysis - Two Players with Same Budget 13.1 Traffic Case 1 - x1 ≤O/2 and x2 ≤ O − x1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.2 Traffic Case 2 - x1 ≤O/2 and x2 > O− x1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.3 Traffic Case 3 - x1 >O/2 and x2 >O/2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Mathematical Analysis - n Players 17.1 Extension from Two-Player Game to n-PlayerGame . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.2 n-PlayerGame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Properties Attained at Nash Equilibrium 25.1 AllocativeEfficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27.2 Pareto Optimality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27.3 WeightedMax-MinFairness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28.4 Weighted Proportional Fairness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Strategy-Proof Mechanism - Max Traffic Declaration 32 Conclusions 35ibliography 37 Proof of Lemma 2.1 40 Proof of Corollary 5.1 44 Proof of Lemma 6.1 48672330 bytesapplication/pdfen-USIEEE 802.22inter-BS coexistencecredit tokengame theoryNash equilibriumstrategy-proofnessthesishttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/188294/1/ntu-98-R96942036-1.pdf