陳業寧臺灣大學：財務金融學研究所羅德謙Lo, Te-ChienTe-ChienLo2007-11-282018-07-092007-11-282018-07-092006http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/60702本篇論文討論經理人與員工「連帶責任」的設計對股東來說是否真的有利。實務上認為連帶責任的設計可使經理人在事前投入更多的努力來監督員工，因此員工犯錯所造成公司的損失會因此降低。本文提出一個雙層代理結構模型來解釋股東-經理人-員工之間的關係，以及經理人的薪資契約如何影響經理人的監督程度和股東的報酬。此外，本文亦考慮經理人與員工之間存在勾結行為，股東透過設計經理人最適薪資契約(Optimal Compensation Contract)來降低經理人的代理行為。本文發現，經理人與員工之間連帶責任的設計雖然會使經理人的監督程度提升，但對股東的報酬是下降的。因此連帶責任的設計對股東而言並非真的有利。此外，本文亦針對勾結行為和監督成本等參數做比較靜態分析。We develop a two-tier agency model that shows how the compensation contract designed by the shareholder for the executive affects the executive’s monitoring and shareholders’ payoff in equilibrium. Empirically, the executive may be blamed and punished for not catching the employee who takes the destroying risky project in advance, called “Joint Responsibility”. Our findings suggest that joint responsibility may not be a good strategy; as long as stopping the risky project benefits more than not stopping it, the shareholder should provide incentives for the executive to stop the risky project at any time. Besides, static comparative analyses show that the changes of the loss of risky projects’ bad outcome, the rent transferred from the employee to the executive, and the constant of the monitoring cost, will affect the optimal compensation contract for the executive, the monitoring of the executive and shareholders’ payoff in equilibrium.Contents I. Introduction--------------------------------------------------------------------1 II. The model----------------------------------------------------------------------4 III. Case 1: Agent 1 Stops the Risky Project at Period 1 and Period 2------7 3.1 The optimal strategy of Agent 1 and Agent 2 in Case 1------------7 3.2 The optimal strategy of Principal------------------------------------11 3.3 The optimal compensation contract in Case 1----------------------16 IV. Case 2: Agent 1 Stops the Risky Project at Period 1 but not at Period 2------------------------------------------------------------17 4.1 The optimal strategy of Agent 1 and Agent 2 in Case 2----------17 4.2 The optimal strategy of Principal in Case 2------------------------20 4.3 The optimal compensation contract in Case 2----------------------24 V. The Comparison of Case 1 and Case 2------------------------------------25 VI. Conclusion and Future Research-----------------------------------------30 Appendix--------------------------------------------------------------------------32 Reference-------------------------------------------------------------------------35434057 bytesapplication/pdfen-US勾結行為薪資契約Cover Upthe Compensation Contractthesishttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/60702/1/ntu-95-R93723090-1.pdf