周善瑜臺灣大學:商學研究所曾得昌Tseng, Te-ChangTe-ChangTseng2010-06-012018-06-292010-06-012018-06-292009U0001-2906200923045300http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/184576本論文分析擁有雙重通路之獨占廠商的最適目標行銷策略。相較於傳統實體通路，網路通路可節省消費者的出門購物成本，但卻無法有效率地提供互動式售前服務。而與之前討論廠商多重通路策略的文獻不同，本論文考慮消費者身處不同使用情境之下，對於互動式售前服務的需求有所差異。本論文利用賽局理論模型探討不同使用情境下之消費者對互動式售前服務的需求差異對於獨占廠商雙重通路策略的影響。本論文假設市場上存在高端以及低端消費者，前者對於互動式售前服務的需求大於後者；此外，同類型消費者在不同使用情境下，對於互動式售前服務的需求亦有差異，以消費者自用以及送禮兩種情境為例，假設身處自用情境的消費者對於互動式售前服務的需求程度大於送禮情境。研究發現廠商的最適雙重通路策略將視兩種使用情境相對出現的機率以及兩類型消費者的相對比例而定，且獲致主要結果如下：(1)廠商是否利用消費者使用情境做為通路區隔基礎，並且將身處送禮情境之消費者導引至網路通路，決定於送禮之高端消費者對於互動式售前服務的需求是否小於自用之低端消費者。(2)另一方面，當送禮之高端消費者對於互動式售前服務的需求小於自用之低端消費者，且送禮情境相對於自用情境出現機率較高，以及低端消費者相對於高端消費者比例較小時，廠商越可能採行以消費者使用情境做為通路區隔變數之最適通路策略。(3)若廠商只專注於利用消費者類型作為市場區隔變數，而不分辨消費者因身處不同使用情境而有所差異，則廠商並未發揮不同銷售通路各具特性的優勢，以幫助其自身針對消費者進行差別取價。This paper analyzes the optimal targeting strategies of a monopolistic marketer for its online and offline distribution channels. Unlike offline traditional distribution channels, online distribution channels make it possible for consumers to save their transportation costs. However, when purchasing online, consumers cannot obtain the interactive presale services they can efficiently obtain when purchasing offline. Unlike previous literature on multi-channel strategies, this paper considers consumer different needs for presale services under different use occasions.his paper develops a game-theoretic framework and examines how consumers’ different needs for presale services in different use occasions may influence the optimal online and offline channel strategies. We consider two types of consumers, high-valuation and low-valuation ones. We assume consumers who have higher valuation for the product also have higher valuation for presale services. Furthermore, the same type consumer might have different valuations for the services under different use occasions. We take self-use and gift-buying as our two representative use occasions. Consumers when buying products for their own use might value presale services more than when buying them as gifts.he results show that the optimal channel strategy depends on the relative frequency of two different use occasions and the relative proportion of the two-type consumers. Furthermore, we have the following results: (1) Whether it is feasible to segment the market by use occasions and induce consumers in gift-buying occasion to purchase online crucially depends on whether high-valuation consumers under gift-buying occasion have lower valuation for presale services than low-valuation consumers under self-use buying occasion. (2) On the other hand, if low-valuation consumers in self-use occasion value presale services more than high-valuation ones in the gift-buying occasion, then the higher the frequency of gift-buying occasion relative to that of self-use buying, and the lower the percentage of low-valuation consumers relative to high-valuation ones, the more likely it is optimal for the firm to segment the market by use occasions. (3) Focusing only on user types and not distinguishing different use occasions of consumers, the firm does not take advantage of the features of different distribution channels to help price discriminate consumers.致謝 Ⅰ文摘要 Ⅱ文摘要 Ⅲ錄 Ⅴ表目錄 Ⅵ一章 緒論 一-1一節 研究動機 一-1二節 研究目的 一-2三節 研究方法與研究結果 一-3二章 文獻探討 二-5三章 一般模型 三-7一節 模型設定 三-7二節 均衡分析 三-10三節 均衡討論 三-17四章 管理意涵與建議 四-31一節 管理意涵 四-31二節 研究限制與未來研究方向 四-33考文獻 四-35錄 四-37錄A 四-37錄B 四-37錄C 四-38錄D 四-38application/pdf701914 bytesapplication/pdfen-US通路訂價通路結構使用情境Channel Price DiscriminationDual ChannelUse Occasionthesishttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/184576/1/ntu-98-R96741018-1.pdf