2017-07-012024-05-17https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/674393摘要：本子計畫第一部分預計探討企業資訊揭露對盈餘品質(earnings quality)的影響。企業資訊揭露可能增加股票價格效率性及企業整體資訊環境，進而減低經理人操縱盈餘的誘因。另一方面，企業資訊揭露亦有可能減低市場交易者的私有資訊產出，致使公司股票價格效率性降低，進而給予經理人較多操縱盈餘的空間。美國證券交易委員會針對企業資訊強制揭露，採分組分期實施，此政策特色幫助在實證上認定(identify)企業資訊揭露與盈餘品質的因果關係。本子計畫第二期部分預計探討共同基金資訊強制揭露對基金績效的影響。理論上，共同基金揭露其投資策略有可能引發市場競爭導致基金投資超額報酬減少，致使績效降低。亦有可能因為投資部位有較好的流動性而減低基金的交易成本而使績效上升。此部分計畫將利用美國證券交易委員會針對共同基金資訊強制揭露，採分組分期實施，此政策特色幫助在實證上認定(identify)揭露基金投資策略是否影響基金績效。本子計畫第三部分預計探討市場意見分歧對公司經理人報酬結構的影響。理論預測當市場意見分歧導致股票價格偏離基本面，則公司將於報酬中給予經理人較多短期誘因，獲取未來以更高價格賣出獲利的可能性。內生性問題讓此理論預測難以檢測，市場意見分歧與經理人報酬有嚴重的內生性關係。因此，此部分計畫將利用美國證券交易委員會隨機放寬部分股票放空限制的試驗，認定(identify)並檢測意見分歧與經理人報酬的因果關係。 <br> Abstract: The first part of this project studies the effect of firms` mandatory disclosure requirements on earnings quality. Mandatory disclosure requirements can improve stock price efficiency and overall firm information environment, leading to less incentives for earnings management. On the other hand, mandatory disclosure can decrease private information production by informed investors, leading to less price efficiency and more earnings management incentives. The EDGAR online disclosure system by the SEC adopted a staggered implementation that helps identify the causal relationship between disclosure and earnings quality. The second part of this project studies the effect of mutual funds` mandatory disclosure requirements on performance. In theory, mutual fund disclosure of investment strategies can lead to competition can lower performance. However, better liquidity in managed positions could lead to better performance. This study exploits the staggered implementation of EDGAR to identify this causal relationship. The third part of this project examines the effect of market disagreement on CEO pay structure. Theory predicts that investor disagreement leads to stock price deviating from its fundamentals. In this case, existing shareholders will give short-term incentives to managers to boost current stock price, hoping to sell to even higher bidders in the future. This study exploits the Reg SHO experiment that relaxed short-sale constraints of a group of pilot firms to identify this relationship.準實驗設計強制揭露經理人報酬Quasi-Natural ExperimentMandatory DisclosureManagerial Compensation