陳其美2006-07-262018-07-092006-07-262018-07-092003http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/16270似乎多餘的選擇權（SRO ）為一 種：她在均衡時不會被執行、而且她 的溢酬一定大於零的選擇權。 本研究證明此種選擇權確實存 在，且其價格將隨著時間流逝而遞 減。在研究公司最適所有權的結構 時，經濟環境體是有以下特徵：(1)經 理人所作的投資決策無法檢證，且其 對企業主能產生無法轉移的私人效 益。(2)公司盈餘是可檢證的。(3)以 可檢證盈餘為標的之各種金融請求權 皆可自由地創造，並且在競爭市場中交易。我們證明了在這樣的經濟環境和 極為一般的資訊結構下，只要一個關 於盈餘之機率分配的維度條件能夠滿 足，則無論公司原本的資本結構為 何，專業經理人都可以透過發行適當 設計之SRO 來遂行最佳的投資效率 性。就在這樣的模型條件下，我們推 導出一個版本的Modigliani-Miller 無關理論。A financial option is a seemingly redundant option (SRO) if it is common knowledge in equilibrium that the option will never be exercised and yet the option premium is strictly positive. We show that SRO's exist and their prices decrease over time. We study the optimal ownership structure of a firm in an economic environment where (i) investment decisions are unverifiable and may create non-transferable benefits to the founder of the firm, (ii) earnings are verifiable, and (iii) any financial claims contingent on the firm's verifiable earnings can be freely created and traded in competitive markets. We show that when a dimensionality condition on the earnings distribution is satisfied, with generic information structure, any initial capital structure together with a professional manager who issues some properly designed SRO's to investors implements the first-best investment efficiency so that a version of the Modigliani-Miller irrelevancy theorem obtains.application/pdf38244 bytesapplication/pdfzh-TW國立臺灣大學財務金融學系暨研究所公司監控不完整契約選擇權定價外部權益Corporate ControlIncomplete ContractsOption PricingOutside Equityreporthttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/16270/1/912416H002016.pdf