李存修臺灣大學：財務金融學研究所桑蔚文Sang, Wei-wenWei-wenSang2007-11-282018-07-092007-11-282018-07-092004http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/60606本研究採用三種不同變數來衡量最終股東對公司的控制力，包括最大股東現金權（CR）、最大股東投票權減現金權（Bias A）與最大股東佔董事會席位減現金權（Bias B）來測量在台灣公司治理與盈餘管理的關係。我們發現在三個變數中只有最大股東佔董事會席位減現金權（Bias B）有顯著且穩定的結果；若我們把Bais A降階成為序列尺度，也可以發現顯著的正相關係，但是大股東現金權（CR）不論在任何情況下都不顯著。因此我們認為：其一、最大股東佔董事會席位減現金權（Bias B）偏離越大則公司越會盈餘管理。其二、最大股東佔董事會席位減現金權（Bias B）似乎比其它兩者更能有效偵測出盈餘管理的發生。In this study we use three controlling proxies as the power to control a firm：CR (cash flow right), bias A (voting right minus cash flow right) and bias B( percentage in board of directors the ultimate controlling shareholder occupied minus cash flow right) to test the relation between corporate governance and earnings management in Taiwan. We find that among three of the controlling proxies, only Bias B has consistent result. After dealing with Bias A by ranking, we can also find significantly positive relation. But CR is not significant in all conditions. Therefore we can conclude that, first, firms with larger bias B tend to have higher earnings management. Second, in Taiwan, bias B is more effective than bias A and cash flow right in detecting possible earnings management.I. INTRODUCTION 1 II. LITERATURES REVIEW 3 II.1. EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 3 II.2. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 7 III. METHODOLOGY 10 III.1. THE DATA 10 III.2. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 14 III.3. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 16 IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 18 IV.1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 18 IV.2. DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS VS. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 19 V. CONCLUSIONS 21 VI. REFERENCES 32221122 bytesapplication/pdfen-US盈餘管理公司治理Earnings managementCorporate governancethesishttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/60606/1/ntu-93-R91723033-1.pdf