工學院: 工業工程學研究所指導教授: 洪一薰紀博瀚Chi, Bo-HanBo-HanChi2017-03-022018-06-292017-03-022018-06-292015http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/271473We propose an incentive mechanism to increase the demand quantities of green products and present two Stackelberg models to describe two different policy instruments, i.e. a condition that the government compensates green firms with subsidy fees and a condition that the government compensates green customers with subsidy fees. Moreover, we consider two probability distributions of customers’ taste parameters in each model. We examine the results of two models with two different probability distributions to find a suitable model to predict actual demand quantities in our experiment. In the subsidy-to-customer condition, customers buying green products, called green customers, receive subsidy fees from the government. We add a behavioral parameter for non-green customers to describe a loss that they do not receive subsidy fees like green customers. In addition, we conduct a validation experiment to show that the model with the behavioral parameter captures the behaviors of customers.991625 bytesapplication/pdf論文公開時間: 2020/7/30論文使用權限: 同意有償授權(權利金給回饋學校)機制設計綠色設計賽局理論行為理論實驗經濟incentive mechanismgreen designgame theorybehavioral operations managementexperimental economics[SDGs]SDG9[SDGs]SDG12thesishttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/271473/1/ntu-104-R02546024-1.pdf