杜榮瑞臺灣大學:會計學研究所胡曉雯Hu, Hsiao-WenHsiao-WenHu2007-11-282018-06-292007-11-282018-06-292005http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw//handle/246246/61700本研究企圖探討獎酬契約之訂定對於經理人行為動機之影響。探 討是否能藉由獎酬契約中非財務指標比重之增加,以降低經理人進行內部人交易或盈餘管理之動機。 除此之外,並進一步利用平衡計分卡的結構,探討是否領先與落 後指標對於經理人行為動機之影響深度不同。 本研究以國內上市櫃公司之總經理為研究對象,以問卷資料方式 蒐集獎酬契約訂定之相關資料,並利用檔案資料來取得其餘所需資 訊,並利用複迴歸分析以及敏感性分析,結果並無法支持所提出之假說。此不顯著的結果可能導因於幾種可能:第一,我國企業對於非財務指標之使用程度較低,而使得非財務指標造成的影響淡化;第二,目前法律上的規定使得內部人交易難以偵測,因此讓從事內部人交易的成本與風險都大幅降低,這可能使得經理人進行交易的動機增強;第三,經理人也許傾向使用業外的方式進行盈餘管理,而這部份並無法由裁量性應計數所捕捉。Title: Incentive Contracts and Managerial Behavior Name: Hsiao-Wen Hu Advisor: Rong-Ruey Duh, Ph.D. Month/Year: June, 2005 This thesis explores the association between incentive contracts and managerial behavior. Financial measures have been suggested to be likely to induce managers to act inconsistent with the interest of shareholders. Thus, incorporating non-financial measures in incentive contracts may mitigate such behavior. Since the learning and growth aspect of non-financial measures are leading indicators of firm performance and will have long-term rather than short-term impact, incorporating this particular measure in the contract may further mitigate manager’s dysfunctional behavior. Two kinds of managerial behavior are examined in this thesis: insider trading and earnings management. Data on the weighting of various performance measures in the CEO incentive contracts are obtained via a questionnaire survey with CEOs of publicly traded companies in Taiwan. The 111 useable responses along with the data for measuring earnings management and insider trading obtained from TEJ Database and Market Observation Post System (MOPS) are analyzed to test the relationship between weighting of non-financial measures and CEO’s insider trading. A similar test is conducted to examine the association between weighting of non-financial measures and earnings management. Further, the association between weighting of learning and growth measures and insider trading (and earnings management) is tested. After controlling for some variables, multiple regression analysis indicates that the coefficients are in the expected sign but all are not significant. Possible explanations and limitations are offered.謝辭..................................................... I 中文摘要............................................... III 英文摘要................................................ IV 目錄.................................................... VI 表目錄................................................ VIII 圖目錄................................................... X 第一部份非財務指標在獎酬契約中之利用程度與盈餘管理之關係1 第一章緒論............................................. 2 第一節研究動機..........................................................................................2 第二節研究目的..........................................................................................4 第三節研究結構..........................................................................................5 第二章文獻探討與假說建立............................... 6 第一節獎酬制度與績效評估....................................................................6 第二節盈餘管理......................................................................................12 第三節假說建立......................................................................................20 第三章研究方法......................................... 22 第一節變數定義與衡量..........................................................................22 第二節研究對象與資料蒐集..................................................................27 第三節資料分析方法與實證模型..........................................................28 第四章研究結果與討論................................... 34 第一節敘述性統計..................................................................................34 第二節假說檢定......................................................................................37 第三節討論..............................................................................................41 第五章結論與建議....................................... 43 第一節研究結論......................................................................................43 第二節研究限制......................................................................................44 第三節對未來研究之建議......................................................................45 第二部份非財務指標在獎酬契約中之利用程度與內部人交易之關 係...................................................... 46 第一章緒論............................................ 47 第一節研究動機........................................................................................47 第二節研究目的........................................................................................49 第三節研究結構........................................................................................50 第二章文獻探討與假說建立.............................. 51 第一節獎酬制度與績效評估..................................................................51 第二節內部人交易..................................................................................57 第三節假說建立......................................................................................68 第三章研究方法......................................... 70 第一節變數定義與衡量..........................................................................70 第二節研究對象與資料蒐集..................................................................78 第三節資料分析方法與實證模型..........................................................79 第四章研究結果與討論................................... 84 第一節敘述性統計..................................................................................84 第二節假說檢定......................................................................................87 第三節討論..............................................................................................89 第五章結論與建議....................................... 92 第一節研究結論......................................................................................92 第二節研究限制......................................................................................93 第三節對未來研究之建議......................................................................94 參考文獻................................................ 95505006 bytesapplication/pdfen-US誘因式獎酬契財務指標非財務指標學習成長內部人交易盈餘管理Incentive contractFinancial measuresNon-financial measuresLearning and growthInsider tradingEarnings management獎酬契約對於經理人行為之影響Incentive Contracts and Managerial Behaviorotherhttp://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/61700/1/ntu-94-R92722003-1.pdf