2017-07-012024-05-17https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/681932摘要：本計畫旨在研究公司使用非一般公認原則(non-GAAP)會計指標來決定經理人績效薪酬的原因與經濟後果。近年來，以績效條件做為既得條件的薪酬(簡稱績效薪酬)在高階主管之薪資報酬中的重要性有逐漸超過傳統權益薪酬(即以時間做為既得條件的股票與股票選擇權)的趨勢。越來越多公司選擇以non-GAAP的會計盈餘數字來決定經理人的績效薪酬，此一做法引來了許多爭議。贊成者表示公司希望經理人努力的績效指標與一般公認會計原則(GAAP)衡量的盈餘原本就不同，而且公司知道什麼樣的財務指標與公司想強調的核心事業與企業策略走向最相關，因此在獎酬合約中調整GAAP盈餘，以non-GAAP的會計數字來決定經理人的績效，藉以激勵經理人從事公司想強調的行為。然而反對者認為，此一做法給予經理人空間去排除不利於績效獎酬衡量的費用，使績效條件更容易達成，因此讓經理人獲得更多的績效薪酬。本研究預計利用美國上市公司2006年後開始提供的績效薪酬揭露資訊，首先研究公司選擇以non-GAAP的會計盈餘數字來決定經理人的績效薪酬的主要原因為何，接著檢視使用non-GAAP會計指標的公司是否較使用GAAP會計指標的公司具有更強或更弱的薪酬績效敏感度(pay-for-performance sensitivity)及未來公司價值，藉此了解此一做法的經濟後果。本研究將採用Heckman Selection Model 處理公司採用non-GAAP會計指標的內生性問題。本文的實證結果預計對充滿爭議性的使用非一般公認會計原則會計指標衡量經理人績效，以及績效薪酬設計的有效性等議題做出貢獻。<br> Abstract: This study examines the reasons and economic consequences of using non-GAAP financial metrics in executive performance-based compensation. Performance-vested compensation has now surpassed time-vested compensation and become the most important component of executive compensation. A growing number of companies use non-GAAP earnings figures to determine whether performance-vested compensation meets the vesting criteria. This practice is controversial. Proponents argue that the goals of the firm to motivate desired behaviors from top management might be very different from the goals of financial reporting mandated by GAAP. And firms know what financial metrics is mostly likely to motivate the behaviors congruent with their strategic emphases and core businesses. Adjusted GAAP earnings and excluding items that is irrelevant in incentivize desired behaviors is intended to steer managers to engage more activities that the firms want the managers to focus on. However, opponents contend that using non-GAAP earnings metrics to determine the vesting of performance-vested compensation gives managers more opportunities to exclude income-decreasing items, which makes it easier for performance-vested compensation to vest and in turn results in excessive compensation. This study plans to use the disclosure about performance-vested compensation mandated by the SEC starting 2006 to study (1) what are the incentives for companies to include non-GAAP earnings figures to determine the performance-vested compensation; and (2) whether firms that use non-GAAP accounting metrics to determine performance-vested compensation exhibit stronger or weaker pay-for-performance sensitivity and future firm value in order to understand the economic consequence of using non-GAAP in executive compensation contracts. This study plans to use the Heckman Selection Model to deal with the endogeneity of the adoption of non-GAAP financial metrics. The empirical results of this study will contribute to the debate of using non-GAAP financial metrics in evaluating managerial performance as well as to the issue of the effectiveness of performance-based compensation design.經理人獎酬績效薪酬非一般公認會計原則會計指標executive compensationperformance-based compensationnon-GAAP measures