https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/414934
標題: | Subordinated Debt, Market Discipline, and Bank Risk | 作者: | YEH-NING CHEN Hasan, Iftekhar |
關鍵字: | Bank capital regulation | Contingent capital certificate | G21 | G28 | Market discipline | Moral hazard | Subordinated debt regulation | 公開日期: | 1-九月-2011 | 出版社: | WILEY-BLACKWELL | 卷: | 43 | 期: | 6 | 起(迄)頁: | 1043 | 來源出版物: | Journal of Money, Credit and Banking | 摘要: | This paper demonstrates that subordinated debt (subdebt thereafter) regulation can be an effective mechanism for disciplining banks. By reducing the chance that managers of distressed banks can take value-destroying actions to benefit themselves, subdebt regulation may encourage banks to lower asset risk. Moreover, subdebt regulation and bank capital requirements can be complements for alleviating the banks' moral hazard problems. To make subdebt regulation effective, regulators may need impose ceilings on the interest rates of subdebt, prohibit collusion between banks and subdebt investors, and require subdebt to convert into the issuing bank's equity when the government provides assistance to the bank. © 2011 The Ohio State University. |
URI: | https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/414934 | ISSN: | 00222879 | DOI: | https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/80051768008 10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00417.x |
顯示於: | 財務金融學系 |
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