|Title:||Short-Termist CEO Compensation in Speculative Markets: A Controlled Experiment||Authors:||YEN-CHENG CHANG
|Issue Date:||28-Jun-2019||Source:||31st Australasian Finance and Banking Conference 2018||Abstract:||
In Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006), existing shareholders use compensation contracts to encourage short-termism when stock prices are speculative, due to investor disagreement and short-sale constraints. Supporting this view, we find an exogenous removal of short-sale constraints curbs short-termist incentives as measured by longer CEO compensation duration. This effect is concentrated among stocks with high investor disagreement and short-term-oriented institutional ownership. We also find that longer CEO compensation duration leads to longer CEO investment horizon, less overinvestment, and less earnings management.
--CICF (Tianjin), AsianFA (Tokyo), AFBC (Sydney), TFA (Taipei), MFA (San Antonio), Paris Financial Management (Paris), SFM (Taiwan)
--Best Paper Award, TFA (Taipei, Taiwan)
--R&R, Contemporary Accounting Research
|Appears in Collections:||財務金融學系|
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