|Title:||Beyond friendly acquisitions: the case of REITs||Authors:||CHIU-LING LU
|Keywords:||Acquisitions; Real Estate Investment Trusts; Announcement effect; Long-term performance; Insider trading; Hubris hypothesis||Issue Date:||2015||Publisher:||SPRINGER||Journal Volume:||44||Journal Issue:||1||Start page/Pages:||139||Source:||Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting||Abstract:||
© 2013, Springer Science+Business Media New York. Unlike operating companies, acquisitions between Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) are friendly and acquirers have been previously found to experience positive announcement effects. This study looks beyond stock response and long term performance and finds that overconfidence motivates REIT managers to acquire other firms or assets within the industry. We find that larger, more profitable, and less transparent REITs with fewer growth opportunities are more likely to become acquirers. We further find that top managers tend to personally buy more shares prior to the acquisition announcement and then sell more shares afterward. Our empirical evidence lends support to the hubris hypothesis.
|Appears in Collections:||國際企業學系|
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