https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/579990
標題: | CEO overconfidence and bank loan contracting | 作者: | Lin C.-Y Chen Y Ho P.-H Yen J.-F. YEH-NING CHEN |
公開日期: | 2020 | 卷: | 64 | 來源出版物: | Journal of Corporate Finance | 摘要: | In this paper, we examine the effect of managerial overconfidence on bank loan spreads. Our theoretical model and empirical results support that firms with highly overconfident CEOs have lower loan spreads and that the reducing effect of these CEOs on the spread is more pronounced when the loan contracts have collateral or covenants. Unlike firms with highly overconfident CEOs, firms with moderately overconfident CEOs do not receive lower loan spreads. We perform various tests to alleviate the concerns about endogeneity, and the results are robust. The results are consistent with the idea that highly overconfident CEOs are more willing to pledge collateral and accept covenants in exchange for a reduction in their loan rate. ? 2020 Elsevier B.V. |
URI: | https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85102242141&doi=10.1016%2fj.jcorpfin.2020.101637&partnerID=40&md5=4a7bcf285f5c3bf7af537dc00c44b592 https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/579990 |
ISSN: | 09291199 | DOI: | 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101637 |
顯示於: | 財務金融學系 |
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