https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/631090
標題: | The effects of executive compensation and outside monitoring on firms' pre-repurchase disclosure behavior and post-repurchase performance | 作者: | SHENG-SYAN CHEN Chou, RK Lee, YC |
關鍵字: | Corporate governance; Repurchase; Voluntary disclosure; Long-term performance; INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; OFFICER COMPENSATION; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; LARGE SHAREHOLDERS; ANALYST COVERAGE; AGENCY COSTS; MARKET; DIRECTORS; OWNERSHIP | 公開日期: | 2020 | 出版社: | SPRINGER | 卷: | 54 | 期: | 1 | 起(迄)頁: | 111-158 | 來源出版物: | REVIEW OF QUANTITATIVE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING | 摘要: | We show that corporate governance mechanisms play an important role in controlling managers’ opportunistic behavior. Low executive equity compensation and a high intensity of outside monitoring help to discourage undesirable self-interested disclosure decisions by management before share repurchases. Corporate governance mechanisms also have a significant impact on long-run abnormal stock prices and operating performance. Firms that manipulate pre-repurchase disclosures experience positive long-term abnormal stock returns. However, we do not find that these firms experience positive long-run operating performance. Corporate governance mechanisms significantly attenuate the tendency toward negative pre-repurchase disclosures and their effects on stock prices and operating performance. |
URI: | https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/631090 | ISSN: | 0924-865X | DOI: | 10.1007/s11156-018-00785-1 |
顯示於: | 財務金融學系 |
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